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COMMENTS 
The Supreme Court's Interpretation Of The Civil 
Rights Act of 1964: Liberty, Equality, and the 
Limitation of Judicial Power? 
Enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964l marked the be- 
ginning of a new era in the history of antidiscrimination law in 
America. Described as "the most comprehensive piece of civil 
rights legislation ever pr~posed,"~ the Act declared that "[nlo 
person in the United States  hall"^ be denied the right to vote: 
to use public accommodations,' facilities: or schools,? to enjoy 
the benefits of federally funded programs,' or to have employ- 
ment opportunitiese "because of such individual's color, religion, 
sex, or national origin."1° 
Congress defined the Civil Rights Act's purpose as being "to 
assure the existing right to equal treatment."" This principle of 
t This Comment was the first-place entry of the 1980 Welch Legal Writing 
Competition, a competition for third-year law student writing a t  the J. Reuben Clark 
Law School. The competition is endowed by Mr. and Mrs. John S. Welch of La Canada, 
California. Mr. Welch is a partner of the Los Angeles law firm of Latham & Watkins. 
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (current version a t  42 U.S.C. $5 1971, 2000a to 
2000h-6 (1976)). 
2. CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN EGRO 524 (A. Blaustein & R. Zangrardo eds. 
1968). 
3. 42 U.S.C. 5 2000d (1976). Accord, id. 5 2000a ("All persons shall be entitled to" 
enjoyment of public accommodations); id. $ 2000e-2(a)(l) (unlawful "to discriminate 
against any individual"). 
4. Id. 5 1971 (title I). 
5. Id. $$ 2000a to 2000a-6 (title 11). 
6. Id. $5 2000b to 2000b-3 (title 111). 
7. Id. 55 2000c to 2000~-9 (title IV). 
8. Id. $5 2000d to 2000d-6 (title VI). 
9. Id. $5 2000e to 2000e-17 (title VII). 
lo. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Accord, id. 5 2000a(a) (all persons entitled to enjoy public 
accommodations "without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, rez 
ligion, or national origin"); id. 5 2000b (protecting persons deprived of equal protection 
of laws "on account of [their] race, color, religion, or national origin"); id. § 2000d (no 
person shall be excluded from participation in federally assisted programs "on the 
ground of race, color, or national origin"). 
11. 110 CONG. REC. 1519 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler). Accord, id. at 7207 ("What 
Title VII seeks to accomplish, what the civil rights bill seeks to accomplish is equal treat- 
ment for all.") (Justice Department interpretative memorandum); id. a t  12,614 ("Every 
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individual equality provided a basis for a "meeting of the 
minds" and a common national purpose "in the long struggle to 
eliminate social prejudice and the effects of prejudice."" Thus, 
under the aegis of an equal treatment value, the 1960's saw the 
elimination of the most flagrant forms of racial discrimination.lS 
When it became apparent that equal treatment would not 
entirely eradicate the effects of past discrimination, the sugges- 
tion that the law adopt an equal status or equal results value 
became more insistent." Some commentators warned that ad- 
herence to an absolutist view of equality threatened libertarian 
values.15 To some degree, the development of antidiscrimination 
law has reflected the tension between libertarian and egalitarian 
points of view. In general, however, the courts have favored 
more and more equality.16 
American citizen has the right to equal treatment-not favored treatment, not complete 
individual equality-just equal treatment.") (remarks of Sen. Muskie). 
Congressmen also frequently stated that the Act would be colorblind in its applica- 
tion, see, e.g., id. a t  5253 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id. a t  6564 (remarks of Sen. 
Kuchel), and that it would not permit differences in treatment on the basis of race, see, 
e.g., id. a t  5611-13 (remarks of Sen. Ervin); id. a t  5863-64, 5866 (remarks of Sen. 
Humphrey). See also T. EASTLAND & W.  BEN^, COUNTING BY RACE 113-14, 143, 205- 
208 (1979); N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 4, 43-45 (1975). 
12. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,416 n.19 (1978) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
13. Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreward: In Defense of the Antidis- 
crimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1976). 
14. See, e.g., Affeldt, Title VII in the Federal Courts-Private or Public Law, 15 
VILL. L. REV. 1, 3, 5-6, 9, 17 (1969); Blumrosen, Seniority and Equal Employment Op- 
portunity: A Glimmer of Hope, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 268,280-84 (1969) [hereinafter cited 
as Blumrosen, Seniority]; Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 
and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 66-75 (1972) 
[hereinafter cited as Blumrosen, Employment Discrimination]; Cooper & Sobol, Senior- 
ity and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Crite- 
ria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1673-78 (1969). 
This Comment uses the terms "equal treatment" and "equal status" consistently 
with their use by Professor Owen Fiss in Fiss, Croups and the Equal Protection Clause, 
5 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. Am. 107 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Fiss, Groups]. Equal treat- 
ment is sometimes referred to as "equality of opportunity," equal status as "equal 
achievement" or "equality of results." See also Comment, Proof of Racially Discrimina- 
tory Purpose Under the Equal Protection Clause: Washington v. Davis, Arlington 
Heights, Mt. Healthy, and Williamsburgh, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 725,727-28 & n.21 
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Proof of Purpose]. 
15. See, e.g., D. SCHAEFER, THE NEW EGALITARIANISM (1979). 
16. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (author- 
izing voluntary preferential treatment in employment); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (consideration of race in admissions decisions permitted in 
some circumstances); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976) (approving race-con- 
scious measures remedying de facto discrimination); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
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While the academic community has been at the forefront, 
the law's gradual shift in emphasis from equal treatment to 
equal status has been aided greatly by reliance on interpretative 
guidelines and regulations issued by federal agencies.'' These 
developments pose significant questions about the roles of the 
respective coordinate branches in the development of civil rights 
policy. The issue of separation of powers looms particularly large 
in attempting to delineate the limits of judicial power to inter- 
pret civil rights legislation. This Comment examines the Su- 
preme Court's use of statutory interpretation in developing lia- 
bility and remedy theories in the Civil Rights Act cases. 
In interpreting the Civil Rights Act, members of the Su- 
preme Court have frequently disagreed on whether an equal 
treatment or equal status value should be implemented. After 
contrasting the general interpretative approach of the Justices 
who advocate equal status with the approach of those who favor 
equal treatment, this Comment evaluates the policies that un- 
derlie each approach in light of traditional democratic theory. 
Part I of the Comment reviews the ideological tension between 
the values of liberty and equality which has figured prominently 
in the formulation of antidiscrimination law. The Court's treat- 
ment of the issues presented in the Civil Rights Act cases gener- 
ally falls under the rubric of one or the other of these two val- 
ues, as is shown in part 11. Part I11 summarizes the 
interpretative techniques that characterize the results reached in 
the cases. Finally, an interpretative approach that emphasizes 
the legislative role is defended against arguments that favor a 
judicial role in the formulation of civil rights policy. 
A. The Ideology of Equality 
Primacy of the individual is classical liberalism's fundamen- 
tal tenet. In this tradition, individuals, rather than groups, are 
the most important unit in society; consequently, the primary 
function of societal arrangements is to allow the individual max- 
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (busing). 
17. See T. EASTLAND & W. BENNETT, supra note 11, at 11-12, 131-36; N. GLAZER, 
supra note 11, at 45-66; G. ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION 33-
46 (1969). 
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imum freedom to fulfill his or her own purposes.18 Inequality 
among individuals is justified as a natural consequence of a ays- 
tem of liberty.'. So long as an individual in acquisition of soci- 
ety's goods does not purposefully disadvantage another, he is en- 
titled to do with his property as he chooses. Because differences 
among individuals are essentially the product of "congenital," 
rather than environmental, factors,aO resulting inequalities are 
not morally suspect. 
Given a diversity of temperaments and desires, the essential 
role of law is to provide neutral rules and procedures whereby 
members of society have an equal opportunity to accomplish 
their individual purposes. The libertarian ethic rejects the no- 
tions "that skin color and ethnicity [are] relevant in any public 
or private consideration of the worth of an indi~idual."~~ Simi- 
larly, equal treatment demands that such matters as race, relig- 
ion, sex, and national origin be irrelevant to law. 
" [I] n formal contradiction to the principle of individual- 
ism," modern equalitarianism makes a claim for "group 
rights."" Accordingly, the primary function of societal arrange- 
ments is to insure that no group in society is significantly worse 
off than any other group. Even inequalities that result from nat- 
ural abilities and talents (as opposed to those that result from 
historical and social fortune) are morally unjustified. The distri- 
bution of society's goods that results from such abilities is, ac- 
cording to John Rawls, "the outcome of the natural lottery; and 
this outcome is arbitrary from a moral perspe~tive."~~ In addi- 
tion, "[ilt is impossible in practice to secure equal chances of 
achievement and culture for those similarly endowed" because 
of the institution of the family: "Even the willingness to make 
an effort, to try, and so to be deserving in the ordinary sense is 
18. Bell, On Meritocracy and Equality, PUBLIC INTEREST, Fall 1972, reprinted in D. 
SCHAEFER, supra note 15, a t  29. See generally 2 F.  HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIB- 
ERTY (1976); H. JAFFA, THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM (1975); Frankel, Equality of Oppor- 
tunity, 81 ETHICS 191 (1971). 
19. F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION F LIBERTY 85-93 (1960). 
20. Id. at 86. 
21. T. EASTLAND & W. BENNETT, supra note 11, at  10. Professor Bell notes that 
"[tlhe liberal principle accepts the elimination of social differences in order to assure an 
equal start, but it justifies unequal result on the basis of natural abilities and talents." 
Bell, supra note 18, at 41 (emphasis in original). See also F. HAYEK, supra note 19, at 85- 
86, 92. 
22. Bell, supra note 18, at  44. See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS ERIOUSLY 
(1977). 
23. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 74 (1971). 
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itself dependent upon happy family and social circum- 
stances. . . . [Tlherefore we may want to adopt a principle 
which recognizes this fact and also mitigates the arbitrary effects 
of the natural 10th-y.'n4 The rule that Rawls would have guide 
the law requires equal distribution of social and economic goods: 
"no one gains or loses from his arbitrary place in the distribu- 
tion of natural assets or his initial position in society without 
giving or receiving compensating advantages in return."26 Simi- 
larly, equal status requires that the law take account of religion, 
ethnicity, class, and color, in order to insure "equality as a fact 
and as a result."" 
Like their philosophical counterparts, equal treatment and 
equal status are fundamentally at  odds. Like liberty, the equal 
treatment principle is "process-oriented." Its implementation in 
antidiscrimination law "emphasizes the purification of the deci- 
sional process."27 Equal status, on the other hand, is "result-ori- 
ented." Its implementation, similar to Rawls' theory of equality, 
"emphasizes the achievement of a certain result, improvement of 
the economic and social position of the protected group."28 In 
short, equal treatment seeks to assure procedural equality; equal 
status, substantive equality. 
B. Application of Equal Treatment and Equal Status 
Principles to Antidiscrimination Law 
The conflict between liberty and equality readily appears as 
these values are applied in moral and political philosophy. Simi- 
larly, the ideas of equal treatment and equal status have engen- 
dered conflicting theories of liability and opposing remedies in 
antidiscrimination law. 
1. Equal treatment 
a. Liability theory. The equal treatment value embodies 
the right to be treated as an equal; it seeks to protect individuals 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 102. See also R. DWORKIN, supra note 22, at 272-74. 
26. Address by President Lyndon B. Johnson, Howard University Commencement 
(June 4, 1965), quoted in THE NEGRO IN TWENT~ETH CENTURY AMERICA 226 (J. Franklin 
& I. Starr eds. 1967). 
27. Fiss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Time Has Come: Antidiscrimination Law in 
the Second Decade After Brown v. Board of Education, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 742, 764 
(1974). 
28. Id. 
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from discrimination on the basis of color, religion, sex, or na- 
tional origin. However, equal treatment does not protect individ- 
uals from discrimination on such bases as merit or ability. 
Therefore, a test that eliminates a disproportionate number of 
black or Spanish-American applicants would not violate equal 
treatment principles if it legitimately measured suitability for a 
particular job requirement; it would violate those principles, 
however, if it were used as a pretext to eliminate them because 
of their color or ethnicity.'@ Therefore, liability for a violation of 
the right to equal treatment arises only when the plaintiff shows 
that the defendant purposefully disadvantages him because of 
his membership in a proscribed class.so Accordingly, a court's 
use of language emphasizing purpose or motive indicates its ad- 
herence to the equal treatment value. 
b. Remedial theory. Race-conscious remedies awarded 
pursuant to findings of unlawful discrimination do not necessa- 
rily violate equal treatment principles. In the case of a court- 
ordered remedy, race "is being used symptomatically . . . to 
identify the victims" of an unlawful practice. Therefore, "the 
benefits are not being conferred because of their race but be- 
cause they are victims of di~crimination.'"~ A remedial order 
may be transformed into a "mechanism for securing not equal 
but preferential treatment," however, when the benefit awarded 
exceeds the harm done.sa But, "[n]otwithstanding the outward 
appearance of unequal treatment," when a court grants compen- 
sation only for the injury inflicted, "the beneficiaries are merely 
29. "Equal treatment," as it is used in this Comment, does not call for strict color- 
blindness. Rather, the appropriate inquiry under this concept is whether the challenged 
practice is based on a proscribed criterion or some other factor, and whether the confer- 
ral of a benefit constituted preferential or equal treatment. 
30. "A discriminatory purpose test is closely related to the value of equal treatment, 
for it attempts to proscribe explicit consideration of race." Proof of Purpose, supra note 
14, a t  731. Equal treatment does not necessarily require proof of "evil motive" or "mens 
rea." See Blumrosen, Employment Discrimination, supra note 14, at 66-67. Accord, 
SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 70-73 (1966). 
Compare Bonfield, The Substance of American Fair Employment Practices Legislation 
I: Employers, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 907, 955-56 (1967) and Note, An American Di- 
lemma-Proof of Discrimination, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 107, 109 (1949) with Comment, 
Burden of Proof in Racial Discrimination Actions Brought Under the Civii Rights Act 
of 1866 and 1870: Disproportionate Impact or Discriminatory Purpose?, 1978 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1030, 1035-37 [hereinafter cited as Burden of Proofl. 
31. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235,307-08 (1971) 
[hereinafter cited as Fiss, Fair Employment Laws]. 
32. Id. a t  307. Accord, Seelman, Employment Testing Law: The Federal Agencies 
Go Public With the Problems, 10 URB. LAW. 1, 63 (1978). 
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treated equally. "'' 
The fact that a remedy awarded to a discrimination victim 
may deprive an innocent third person of a benefit does not vio- 
late equal treatment so long as the victim is given only his due. 
Equal treatment requires that a court "eliminate only that por- 
tion of the [harm] attributable to past dis~rimination."~~ Efforts 
by courts to limit remedies in this fashion therefore evidence en- 
dorsement of equal treatment. 
So-called benign discrimination violates equal treatment be- 
cause the essential mutuality between wrongdoer and beneficiary 
is lacking."' Unless the race-conscious measure is linked to an 
identified, individualized harm, there is no justification for pre- 
ferring one person over another.36 This does not imply that only 
courts are capable of ascertaining the victims of discrimination, 
the extent of the injury, and the consequent harm." Equal treat- 
ment does require, however, that these determinations comport 
with principles of procedural fairne~s.'~ 
2. Equal status 
a. Liability theory. The equal status value embodies the 
right to be treated unequally in order to achieve equal results; it 
protects individuals against any device that causes inequality, 
regardless of the intent with which the device is used.'@ Prima 
facie liability for a violation of the right to equal status arises 
33. Fiss, Fair Employment Laws, supra note 31, at 308. 
34. Id. at  307. 
35. See Brest, supra note 13, at 39-43. 
36. For an overview of the relationship between equal treatment, equal status, and 
preferential treatment, see EQUALITY AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT (M. Cohen, T. Nagel 
& T. Scanlond eds. 1977). 
37. "We have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as mem- 
bers of relatively victimized groups at  the expense of other innocent individuals in the 
absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory 
violations." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (Powell, J.) 
(emphasis added). 
38. Justice Powell suggests that only certain governmental bodies can perform this 
function without violating the principle of equal treatment: 
[Ilsolated segments of our vast governmental structures are not competent to 
make those decisions, at least in the absence of legislative mandates and legis- 
latively determined criteria. Before relying upon these sorts of findings in es- 
tablishing a racial classification, a governmental body must have the authority 
and capability to establish, in the record, that the classification is responsive to 
identified discrimination. 
Id. at 309 (citations and footnote omitted). 
39. See cases cited in Proof of Purpose, supra note 14, at 728 n.24. 
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any time a practice has a disparate impact on members of cer- 
tain classes.40 
Disparate impact analysis has emerged as one of the princi- 
pal means for implementing an equal status value." In the 
1960's this new theory was developed in response to efforts by 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the 
Departments of Justice and Labor, the NAACP, the Legal De- 
fense and Education Fund, Inc., and other plaintiffs' counsel to 
formulate a concept of discrimination that would accelerate the 
economic progress of minority  group^.'^ Disparate impact analy- 
sis accomplishes this result in two ways. First, plaintiffs are 
aided by a presumption that differential impact is the functional 
equivalent of discrimination according to race or some other for- 
bidden c r i t e r i ~ n . ~ ~  In short, a showing of disparate impact shifts 
the burden of prod~ction.~~ Second, the rebuttal burden is set so 
high under an equal status standard that it is rarely met. Conse- 
quently, plaintiffs will usually prevail merely by showing adverse 
impact." Use of disparate impact analysis, then, indicates ad- 
herence to an equal status standard. 
b. Remedial theory. Preferential treatment46 abrogates the 
40. See Seelman, supra note 32, at 55-56; Proof of Purpose, supra note 14, a t  729 & 
n.27. 
41. See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 65- 
75 (1976); Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial' Discrimination, 125 U .  
PA. L. REV. 540, 553-62 (1977); Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment 
Testing: Statistical Proof under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REV. 793 (1978); Shoben, Probing 
the Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact 
Analysis Under Title VII, 56 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1977); Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case 
in Employment Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 Hrurv. L. REV. 
387 (1975). 
42. Blumrosen, Employment Discrimination, supra note 14, a t  69-70, 71, 74 & n.44.. 
See also Seelman, supra note 32, at 4. In 1968, Professor Blumrosen suggested "that the 
objective criterion to which the civil rights interest is moving is the number of minorities 
employed in various job classifications . . . . The reduction of differential unemployment 
rates between the minority and majority requires that employers hire greater proportions 
of minorities." Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 465, 504 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Blumrosen, Fair Recruit- 
ment]. See generally sources cited note 14, supra. 
43. Fiss, Fair Employment Laws, supra note 31, a t  290-304. See also Burden of 
Proof, supra note 30, a t  1051 & n.llO. 
44. One commentator charges that the implementation of equal status through the 
allocation of burden of proof has allowed "the manipulation of the courts to favor minor- 
ities." Producing evidence of disparate impact in testing cases, he suggests, "is no more 
difficult than picking up stones from a gravel road. Plaintiffs utilizing adverse impact 
evidence, thus, have no real burden of proof." Seelman, supra note 32, at 55. 
45. Id. at 55-56. 
46. The literature on preferential treatment is extensive. See, e.g., Ely, The Consti- 
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mutuality principle. Commensurate with the idea of equal sta- 
tus, race-conscious remedial measures need not be granted solely 
to identified victims of purposeful discrimination, nor need they 
be paid for by adjudged wrongdoers. Favorable treatment is fre- 
quently justified under a group theory or an individual theory of 
compensation. Under a group theory preferential treatment is 
morally justified because of the individual's membership in a 
group that has been treated unfairly in the past. Under an indi- 
vidual theory, compensation is justified because the individual 
presumably has been treated unfairly at some point in his own 
past?' 
In the final analysis, the validity of race-conscious treat- 
ment under the equal status value does not depend on the legiti- 
macy of these moral claims. Given absolute repudiation of ine- 
quality, equal status is its own justification for preferential 
treatment. These theories are the product, however, of the "ma- 
jor new effort to provide a philosophical foundation-a concep- 
tion of justice as fairness-for a communal society,"48 a society 
founded on the equal status principle. Courts that authorize 
preferential treatment implement equal status. Moreover, pursu- 
ant to its focus on substantive equality, equal status does not 
require any particular procedural safeguards prerequisite to im- 
plementing remedial measures, and private individuals or insti- 
tutions may grant preferential treatment as readily as courts or 
other governmental bodies.'@ 
Antidiscrimination cases generally fall into two classes: 
tutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974); Harkins, 
Affirmative Action: The Constitution, Jurisprudence and the Formulation of Policy, 26 
KAN. L. REV. 85 (1977); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the 
Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363 (1966). 
47. See generally EQUALITY AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT, supra note 36. 
48. Bell, supra note 18, at  35. Bell describes the impetus for this effort as follows: 
If equality of result is to be the main object of social policy . . . it will demand 
an entirely new political agenda for the social systems of advanced industrial 
countries. But no such political demand can ultimately succeed without being 
rooted in some powerful ethical system . . . . 
Id. See also Kristol, About Equality, COMMENTARY, NOV. 1972, reprinted in D. SCHAEFER, 
supra note 15, at 219. 
49. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). See gener- 
ally Sedler, Beyond Bakke: The Constitution and Redressing the Social History of Ra- 
cism, 14 HARV. C.R.X.L. L. REV. 133 (1979). 
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those involving disparate treatment and those involving dispa- 
rate irnpact?O Disparate treatment means treating "some people 
less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin." Disparate impact involves "practices 
that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups 
but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another?l 
Because the civil rights cases generally involve both a finding of 
liability and the determination of an appropriate remedy, the 
Supreme Court may adopt equal treatment and equal status 
theories in the same case. For example, the Court may decide in 
a disparate impact case that disparate impact evidence alone es- 
tablishes liability. However, the Court, consistent with the equal 
treatment principle, may limit the remedy to neutralizing the 
discriminatory effects of the facially neutral criteria. Where this 
occurs, the liability and remedy issues are discussed separately, 
according to the value implemented in deciding each issue.62 
A. The Equal Treatment Cases 
1.  Developing a theory of liability in disparate treatment 
cases: McDonnell Douglas, Teamsters, and Furnco 
Most cases brought in the early years following enactment 
50. These terms are often used to define the standard of proof required to trigger 
"strict scrutiny" under the equal protection clause, see Proof of Purpose, supra note 14, 
a t  726 & n.19, 730-31 & n.28, or to establish a prima facie violation of the Civil Rights 
Act. 
This Comment does not discuss cases that deal with procedural aspects of the Civil 
Rights Act. For an example of a procedural case, see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 
415 U.S. 36 (1974) (title VII action not foreclosed by prior arbitral decision). 
51. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). 
52. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). In the early cases 
the issue of which value is protected by the Civil Rights Act was not as sharply framed 
as it later came to be. Compare McDonnel Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), 
and Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1973), with Gen- 
eral Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). Dicta in these cases indicated that the 
Court believed equal treatment was intended though the holdings indicated the contrary. 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), for example, held that evidence of dispa- 
rate impact establishes a prima facie case, but stated that "[d]iscriminatory preference 
for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed." 
Id. a t  431. Consequently, Griggs has been cited in cases endorsing equal treatment as 
well as in cases implementing equal status. Compare United Steelworkers ofAmerica v. 
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 218 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Wa- 
ters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978); City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water and Power v. Man- 
hart, 435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 US. 273, 
279 (1976); and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,800 (1973) with Nash- 
ville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136,141 (1977); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329- 
30 (1977); and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975). 
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of the Civil Rights Act involved disparate treatment? Usually 
the alleged discriminatory conduct did not challenge the tradi- 
tional standards for allocating the burden of proof. As the most 
flagrant discriminatory practices were eliminated,M however, 
burden of proof more frequently became an issue?The Court 
first formulated a detailed test for proof of racial discrimination 
in disparate treatment cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. u. 
Green." Green was a mechanic and long-time civil rights activist 
who was laid off in the course of a general reduction in McDon- 
nell Douglas Corporation's work force. In protesting his dis- 
charge, Green participated in an illegal "stall-in" and, as Mc- 
Donne11 Douglas alleged, a "lock-in." Three weeks later, when 
the company advertised for qualified mechanics, Green applied 
for reemployment. According to McDonnell Douglas, Green's ap- 
plication was rejected because of his participation in the illegal 
activities?' 
The Supreme Court stated that a plaintiff could establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination by proving four facts: 
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and 
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking ap- 
plicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; 
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open 
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of 
53. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (refusal to serve 
blacks); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) (refusal to serve blacks); United States v. 
Johnson, 390 U.S. 563 (1968) (conspiracy to injure blacks in the exercise of their right to 
patronize restaurant); Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964) (blacks convicted 
for participating in "sit-ins" at lunch counters); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 
(1964) (refusal to serve blacks); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 
241 (1964) (refusal to accommodate blacks). 
The first title VII case to reach the Supreme Court, Phillips v. Martin Marietta 
Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971), involved disparate treatment. Martin Marietta had refused 
job applications from women with pre-school-age children, but had employed men with 
pre-school-age children. The Suphme Court, in a per curiam opinion, stated that the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 required that similarly situated persons "be given employment 
opportunities irrespective of their sex." Section 703(a) did not permit "one hiring policy 
for women and another for men-each having pre-school-age children." The Court re- 
manded for the trial court to determine whether "conflicting family obligations" justified 
the disparate hiring policies under the bona fide occupational qualification exemption of 
8 703(e). Id. a t  544. 
54. See Brest, supra note 13, at 2. 
55. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); United States v. De- 
Rosie, 473 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1973); Dean v. Ashling, 409 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1969). 
56. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
57. Id. at 794-96. 
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complainant's  qualification^.^^ 
Establishment of a prima facie case constitutes the first step in 
the Court's liability formula. As to this first step, the Supreme 
Court found, as did the lower court:@ that Green had met his 
burden of proof. In the second step, the burden of going forward 
shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondis- 
criminatory reason for the [plaintiffs] rejecti~n."~~ The Supreme 
Court held that McDonnell Douglas had met its burden under 
this second step.@l The Court also defined a third step, that of 
shifting the burden back to Green to prove that the employer's 
stated reasons for refusing to employ him were in fact a 
pretext.@% 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United 
decided four years after McDonnelI Douglas, involved two "pat- 
tern or p ra~ t i ce"~  actions against T.1.M.E.-D.C. Trucking Com- 
pany and the Teamsters Union, challenging purposeful disparate 
58. Id. at 802. 
59. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated and 
remanded, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
60. 411 U.S. at 802. 
61. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit partly based its formulation of the 
allocation of proof on Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), a disparate impact 
case involving standardized testa and educational requirements. See Green v. McDonnell 
Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d at 352 (revised majority opinion); 463 F.2d at 350,355 (Johnsen, 
J., dissenting). Griggs held that plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of discrimi- 
nation under title VII by showing that the challenged selection criterion had an adverse 
racial impact. The burden then shifted to the defendant to prove that the requirements 
"bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs" for which they 
are used. 401 U.S. at 431. 
On appeal of McDonnell Douglas, however, the Supreme Court refused to extend 
the Griggs burden of proof formulation to Green. Instead, Justice Powell emphasized 
dictum in Griggs indicating that title VII prohibits " 'preference for any group, minority 
or majority.' " He also noted that "[tlhere are societal as well as personal interests on 
both sides of [the employment application] equation." 411 U.S. at 800-01 (quoting 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 430). What title VII requires is that employment 
decisions be "racially neutral." However, the Court did accept the Griggs definition of 
title VII's purpose, "to assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate 
those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job en- 
vironments to the disadvantage of minority citizens." Id. at 800. 
62. 411 U.S. at 804. The Court did not suggest that the plaintiff must provide evi- 
dence of subjective intent. Indeed, citing Blumrosen, Employment Discrimination, 
supra note 14, the Court went so far as to note that statistics "may be helpful" in meet- 
ing this burden. 411 U.S. at 805 & n.19. However, the Court warned against overreliance 
on statistical data "We caution that such general determinations, while helpful, may not 
be in and of themselves controlling as to an individualized hiring decision, particularly in 
the presence of an otherwise justifiable reason for refusing to hire." Id. at 805 n.19. 
63. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
64. See id. at 366 11-16. 
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treatment in the hiring, assignment, and promotion of minority 
employees. The Supreme Court held that defendants had vio- 
lated title VII by purposefully treating minority members less 
favorably than white persons. The Court refined the McDonnell 
Douglas liability theory by noting that in disparate treatment 
cases "[plroof of discriminatory motive is c r i t i~a l . "~~  
In reaffirming the equal treatment conception of proof of 
discriminatory motive, however, the Court clearly was not re- 
quiring "direct proof of dis~rimination."~~ Rather, the Court en- 
gaged the use of an inference that a "decision was based on a 
discriminatory criterion" when the plaintiff shows that his rejec- 
tion was not legitimately based on lack of qualification, the ab- 
sence of a vacancy, or some other legitimate reason.07 
The trend toward reinforcement of an equal treatment in- 
terpretation of title VII, a t  least in disparate treatment cases, 
continued in the following term. In Furnco Construction Corp. 
v.  water^,^' the Supreme Court rebuffed a lower court attempt 
to shift the focus toward equal status. Furnco involved the al- 
leged discriminatory refusal to hire three black bricklayers. The 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in construing the Me- 
Donne11 Douglas test, required the employer to show that the 
hiring method chosen "maximize[d] hiring of minority employ- 
e e ~ " ~ @  in order to rebut the prima facie finding of discrimination. 
The Seventh Circuit's liability formula incorporated equal status 
values by requiring employers not only to consider race in devel- 
oping its hiring policies, but to choose a policy that would pro- 
mote the employment of the largest number of minority 
applicants. 
The Court rejected this approach as without "support either 
in the nature of the prima facie case or the purpose of Title 
VII."70 Rearming  the Teamsters case's equal treatment con- 
cept of discrimination, Justice Rehnquist noted that McDonnell 
Douglas did not abrogate the plaintiffs burden of proving dis- 
65. Id. at 335 n.15. 
66. Id. at 358 11-44. 
67. Id. at 358 & n.44. 
68. 438 U S .  567 (1978). 
69. Id. at 577-78. The court of appeals also "apparently equat[ed] a prima facie 
showing . . . with an ultimate finding of fact as to discriminatory refusal to hire under 
Title VII." Id. at 576. Such a standard of proof allows a plaintiff to establish a violation 
of title VII merely by means of a presumption, rather than by proof of discrimination. 
See id. at 577. 
70. Id. at 577. 
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criminatory intent.ll As long as an employer shows " 'some legit- 
imate, nondiscriminatory reason for the [applicant's] rejec- 
tion,' " the burden remains on the plaintiff to "introduce 
evidence that the proffered justification is merely a pretext for 
dis~rimination."~~ Moreover, the Court reaffirmed the equal 
treatment principle "that the obligation imposed by Title VII is 
to provide an equal opportunity for each applicant regardless of 
race, without regard to whether members of the applicant's race 
are already proportionately represented in the work force."7s 
In allocating the burden of proof in the disparate treatment 
cases reviewed above, the Court has recognized the realities of 
proof in modern discrimination cases without compromising the 
equal treatment value. In light of the subtle forms in which ra- 
cial discrimination can manifest itself," the Court has assisted 
the plaintiff by presuming, in the absence of legitimate explana- 
tions to the contrary, that acts of disparate treatment "are more 
likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible fac- 
t o r ~ . " ~ ~  Nevertheless, attempts to dilute the equal treatment 
value were firmly rebuffed in Furnco. However, it is unclear to 
what extent the Court's commitment to equal treatment in these 
cases resulted from deference to traditional standards of proof in 
71. Id. C 
72. Id. at 578 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802). The 
Court went on to note that statistical proof of a balanced work force was probative of a 
nondiscriminatory "motive" and "not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent." There- 
fore, such evidence could be used to rebut the inference of "discriminatory animus" cre- 
ated by evidence of disparate treatment. Id. at 580. 
73. Id. at 579. The Court reafl[irmed its intention to maintain an equal treatment 
approach in disparate treatment cases in Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. 
Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978). In a per curiam opinion, with four Justices dissenting, the 
Court remanded a decision by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit "[blecause [it] 
appears to have imposed a heavier burden on the employer than Furnco warrants." Id. 
at 25. The First Circuit described the employer's burden under McDonnell Douglas as 
"requiring the defendant to prove absence of discriminatory motive, [thus] plac[ing] the 
burden squarely on the party with the greater access to such evidence." Sweeney v. 
Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 569 F.2d 169,177 (1st Cir.), vacated, 439 U.S. 
24 (1978). Such a standard, the Court noted, "would make entirely superfluous the third 
step in the Furnco-McDonnell Dough analysis, since it would place on the employer at 
the second stage the burden of showing that the reason for rejection was not a pretext, 
rather than requiring such proof from the employee as a part of the third step." Board of 
Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. at 24 n.1. Justice Stevens, dissent- 
ing, argued that the "Court's action implies that the recent opinion in [Furnco] made 
some change in the law as explained in [McDonnell Douglas]." Id. at 26. 
74. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 365 11-51. 
75. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. at 577. Accord, International Bhd. of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 358 n.44. 
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disparate treatment cases or from a conviction that such stan- 
dards are mandated by the terms of the Civil Rights Act. 
2. McDonald-an equal treatment view of section 703(a) 
Dicta in McDonnell Douglas, Teamsters, and Furnco sug- 
gest that the Court recognized in the Civil Rights Act a congres- 
sional intent to implement equal treatment." However, in for- 
mulating the liability theory developed in these cases, the Court 
did not expressly interpret any prohibitory provision of the stat- 
ute. In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation CO.,~' the 
Court interpreted section 703(a), one of title VII's prohibitory 
sections. In doing so, the Court for the first time appeared to 
expressly adopt an equal treatment interpretation of the Civil 
Rights Act.18 
Section 703(a) prohibits an employer from discharging "any 
individual . . . because of such individual's race."7@ In McDon- 
ald, three employees, one black and two white, were charged 
with stealing sixty one-gallon cans of antifreeze from a Santa Fe 
Trail Transportation Company shipment. The two white em- 
ployees were discharged, while the black was retained. The lower 
court dismissed the case on the ground that the disparate treat- 
ment "[did] not raise a claim upon which Title VII relief may be 
granted?" The Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that 
"Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white peti- 
tioners in this case upon the same standards as would be appli- 
76. In McDonnell Douglas, the Court noted that "[nlothing in Title VII compels an 
employer to absolve and rehire one who has engaged in the . . . deliberate, unlawful 
activity against it." 411 U.S. at  803. In several cases, the Court has made reference to 
title VII's "purpose." See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. at  577; Interna- 
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at  335 n.15 ("Undoubtedly disparate 
treatment was the moat obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII"). 
77. 427 U.S. 273 (1976). 
78. See id. at  278-85. 
79. 42 U.S.C. 8 2000e-2(a) (1976) provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer- 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ- 
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em- 
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
80. 427 U.S. at  278. 
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cable were they Negroe~."~~ 
Justice Marshall began his analysis of the statute by noting 
that the terms of section 703(a) "are not limited to discrimina- 
tion against members of any particular race."" The Civil Rights 
Act prohibits " '[d]iscriminatory preference for any [racial] 
group, minority or majority.' "83 However, Justice Marshall 
went even further in substantiating title VII's equal treatment 
value by citing "uncontradicted legislative hist~ry."~' Moreover, 
the Court expressly rejected the notion that benign discrimina- 
tion against whites in "isolated cases" was acceptable under title 
VII.86 Relying on the McDonnell Douglas case's liability theory, 
the Court found that because the criteria for discharge had not 
been " 'applied alike to members of all races,' " the petitioners' 
title VII claims had to be re in~ta ted .~~ 
3. Teamsters and the perpetuation of effects of past discrimi- 
nation: an equal treatment view of section 703(h) 
Section 703(h) permits an employer "to apply different 
standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority . . . 
system."" Seniority systems frequently have a disproportionate 
adverse impact on minority employees because they perpetuate 
the effects of prior discriminatory employment practices. Be- 
cause they are race-neutral, however, seniority systems do not 
normally give rise to liability under an equal treatment theory. 
By contrast, Griggs v. Duke Power CO.,~' which involved stan- 
81. Id. at 280. 
82. Id. at 278-79. 
83. Id. a t  279 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 431) (emphasis in 
original). 
84. Id. at 280. Compare the Court's use of title VII's legislative history here with 
that in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 US. 193, 203-07 (1979). 
85. 427 U.S. at 280-81 n.8. However, the Court distinguished "isolated" acts of dis- 
crimination against whites from judicially imposed remedies or affirmative action pro- 
grams "otherwise prompted." Id. 
86. Id. a t  283, 285 (quoting 411 U.S. a t  804). 
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). The section provides in relevant part: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of 
compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pur- 
suant to a bona fide seniority . . . system, . . . provided that such differences 
are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, relig- 
ion, sex, or national origin. 
88. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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dardized tests and educational requirements, implemented an 
equal status value in a disparate impact setting. The Griggs 
Court held that "practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their 
face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained 
if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory 
employment  practice^."^^ The lower courts in Teamsters, apply- 
ing the Griggs rationale, found that a competitive seniority sys- 
tem contained in a collective bargaining agreement between the 
Teamsters and T.1.M.E.-D.C. violated title VII because it 
"locked" minorities into inferior jobs and perpetuated prior dis- 
crimination by discouraging transfers to higher paying jobs? 
The Supreme Court conceded that "[wlere it not for 5 703(h), 
the seniority system in this case would seem to fall under the 
Griggs rationale."@' But the Court held that "Congress consid- 
ered [the perpetuation] effect of many seniority systems and ex- 
tended a measure of immunity to them."e2 Consequently, for the 
89. Id. at 430. 
90. 431 US. at 343-46. 
91. Id. at 349. 
92. Id. at 350. The Court rejected the government's theory that the perpetuation of 
prior discrimination through the operation of a race-neutral seniority system constituted 
a continuing violation of title VII. Id. at  345-54. 
The Court distinguished in its analysis between pre- and post-Act discrimination. 
The government had argued that a seniority system which perpetuates the effects of 
prior discrimination-pre-Act or post-Act--could never be "bona fide" under 703(h). 
The Court noted, however, that post-Act discriminatees could obtain full "make whole" 
relief under the Court's prior holding in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 
(1976), "without attacking the legality of the seniority system as applied to them." 431 
U.S. at 347. 
The Court's analysis of the pre- and post-Act issue, as Justice Marshall notes in 
dissent, is not based on the legislative history of section 703(h). Id. at 383-84 (Marshall, 
J., concurring in part m d  dissenting in part). Justice Marshall's contention that the sec- 
tion does not legalize seniority systems which perpetuate post-Act discrimination as- 
sumes, however, that Congress intended the A d  to pioscribe neutral systems that result 
in discriminatory effects. The legislative history is directly to the contrary. As the Justice 
Department Memorandum placed in the Congressional Record by Senator Clark indi- 
cates, title VII proscribes unequal treatment, not unequal effects: 
Title VII is directed at discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin. I t  is perfectly clear that when a worker is laid off or denied a 
chance for promotion because under established seniority rules he is "low man 
on the totem pole" he is not being discriminated against because of his race. 
Of course, if the seniority rule itself is discriminatory, it would be unlawful 
under Title VII. If a rule were to state that all Negroes must be laid off before 
any white man, such a rule [would be unlawful] . . . . Any difference in treat- 
ment based on established seniority rights would not be based on race and 
would not be forbidden by the title. 
110 CONG. REC. 7207 (1964) (emphasis added). Accord, id. at  7217 (remarks of Sen. 
Clark); id. at 6549 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id. at  6563-64 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel). 
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first time in a disparate impact context, the Court refused to 
implement equal status. 
The Court's analysis of the legislative history relied heavily 
on several memoranda entered into the Congressional Record in 
response to criticism that title VII would destroy existing senior- 
ity rights." Although these memoranda were entered before sec- 
tion 703(h) was adopted, the Court found that the chronology of 
events leading up to the addition of section 703(h) indicated 
that the memoranda were "authoritative indicators of that sec- 
tion's purpo~e."~ The "unmistakable purpose of 5 703(h)," the 
Court concluded, "was to make clear that the routine applica- 
t b n  of a bona fide seniority system would not be unlawful under 
Title VII."96 In light of the purpose exhibited in the legislative 
history, the Court rejected arguments that no seniority system 
that tends to perpetuate pre-Act discrimination can be "bona 
fide?"' Similarly, it rejected a reading of the words "an inten- 
tion to discriminate" to mean the effect of the application of a 
seniority system rather than the purpose or intent for which it is 
used?' 
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented, ar- 
guing that Congress did not expressly consider whether neutral 
systems that perpetuated the effects of prior discrimination vio- 
lated the Civil Rights Act. Reading the legislative history very 
narrowly, he concluded that the "only evils" that Congress ad- 
dressed were seniority systems that were fictional or 
nonremedial or that had a disparate impact on newly hired mi- 
In United Airlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977), handed down on the same day as 
Teamsters, the Court rejected a reading of section 703(h) that would immunize attacks 
on seniority systems based on the consequences of acts that occurred prior to the enact- 
ment of title VII, but would allow such attacks when the consequences resulted from 
post-Act discrimination. Id. at 560. 
93. 431 US. at 350-51 (interpretative memorandum by Senators Clark and Case); 
id. at 351 (interpretative memorandum by Justice Department); id. at 351 n.36 (ques- 
tions and answers prepared by Sen. Clark). 
94. Id. at 352. Justice Marshall, in dissent, noted that the three documents concern- 
ing seniority introduced by Senator Clark were written "many weeks" before section 
703(h) was introduced: "Accordingly, they do not specifically discuss the meaning of the 
proviso." Id. at 382 & n.6 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The 
Court in response, stated that "tilt is inconceivable that 8 703(h), as part of a compro- 
mise bill, was intended to vitiate the earlier representations of the Act's supporters by 
increasing Title VII's impact on seniority systems." Id. at 352. 
95. Id. at 352. 
96. Id. at 353. 
97. Id. at 353 11.38. Compare id. at 381 (Marshall, J., dissenting) with Seelman, 
supra note 32, at 25 & n.115, 35-36, 51-52. 
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nority employees." Since, as the Court acknowledged, " 'there 
seem[ed] to be no explicit reference in the legislative history to 
pre-Act discriminatees already employed in less desirable jobs,' 
[olur task . . . is 'to put to ourselves the question,'which choice 
is it the more likely that Congress would have made' had it fo- 
cused on the pr~blem.' '~~ Justice Marshall approached this prob- 
lem by first examining "the devastating impact" the Court's 
holding would have on minority groups. Noting remarks by sev- 
eral legislators, Marshall in effect concluded that Congress 
wanted to achieve economic equality-"to enable black workers 
to assume their rightful place in society."loO 
Justice Marshall bolstered his finding of this congressional 
purpose with two post-enactment developments: EEOC inter- 
pretations invalidating seniority systems that perpetuate prior 
discriminationlol and legislative history accompanying the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.1°2 The materials Justice 
Marshall found persuasive included committee reports citing 
lower court decisions and law review articles approving the "per- 
petuation principle."loS In addition, he cited a canon of statutory 
interpretation authorizing reliance on subsequent legislation to 
interpret prior legislation on the same subject matter? 
In responding to these arguments, the Court disapproved 
the use of subsequent legislative interpretations of the 1964 Act: 
[Tlhe section of Title VII that we construe here, § 703(h), was 
enacted in 1964, not 1972. The views of members of a later 
Congress, concerning different sections of Title VII, enacted af- 
ter this litigation commenced, are entitled to little if any 
weight. It  is the intent of the Congress that enacted 9 703(h) in 
1964, unmistakable in this case, that controls.105 
The Court's refusal to extend the Griggs rationale to neutral 
98. 431 U.S. a t  385-86 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
99. Id. at 386-87 (quoting Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 285 (1933)). 
100. Id. at 389. 
101. On this point, Justice Marshall concedes that the Court "may have retreated" 
from its prior view that the interpretations of the EEOC are " 'entitled to great defer- 
ence.'" Id. at  390 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975)). 
Compare General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976), with Albemarle 
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,430-31 (1975), and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 
424, 433-34 (1971). 
102. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at  42 U.S.C. 5 2000e (1976)). 
103. 431 U.S.' a t  391-92 & n.21 (dissenting opinion). 
104. Id. at  393-94. 
105. Id. at 354 n.39. 
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systems that perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination, par- 
ticularly in light of the overwhelming judicial and academic 
opinion to the cozitrary,lw reflects a decided deference to the 
equal treatment mandate. 
4. Albemarle, Franks, and the scope of the remedy under sec- 
tion 706(g): equal treatment or equal status? 
Section 706(g), title VII's remedial provision, authorizes a 
court to "order such atfirmative action as may be appropriate, 
which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring 
of employees, with or without back pay."lo7 Congress amended 
Section 706(g) in 1972.1°8 Accordingly, the Court relied exten- 
sively on the 1972 amendments to construe the section in Al- 
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody. lW 
In Albemarle, a class of present and former black employees 
sought injunctive relief from the discriminatory effects of the 
plant's testing practices and seniority system. Five years after 
the complaint was filed, the class moved to add a backpay de- 
mand. The district court found that Albemarle's seniority sys- 
tem violated title VII, but refused to order backpay because the 
company had not acted in bad faith.l1° The Supreme Court held 
that the absence of bad faith is not a sufficient reason for deny- 
ing backpay. Citing Griggs, the Court noted that "Title VII is 
not concerned with the employer's 'good intent or absence of 
discriminatory intent' for 'Congress directed the thrust of the 
Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply 
the motivation.' "ll1 
The Court noted that in amending section 706(g), the Sen- 
ate rejected several amendments that would have restricted that 
section's backpay provision.11a In addition, the Court supported 
its reading of the statute with other statements from the legisla- 
tive history1lS and with contemporaneous interpretations of the 
106. See id. at 378-80 and accompanying notes (Marshall, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
107. 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(g) (1976). 
108. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(g) (1976)). 
109. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
110. Id. at 410. 
111. Id. at 422 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971) (empha- 
sis in original)). 
112. 422 U.S. at 414 n.8, 420 & n.13. 
113. Id. 
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National Labor Relations Act's backpay provision,l14 after which 
section 706(g) was expressly modeled.l1Vhi1e the Court's strict 
holding on the backpay issue is not inconsistent with equal 
treatment, its reasoning and statutory interpretation were heav- 
ily influenced by the Griggs equal status analysis. 
In Franks u. Bowman Transportation Co.,l16 the Court held 
that persons to whom the defendant had wrongfully denied em- 
ployment were presumptively entitled to a full competitive, as 
well as a benefit, kind of seniority applied retroactively to the 
date of their initial job application.l17 Because the plaintiffs in 
Franks were individually identified victims of the employer's 
discriminatory practices, the Court's holding need not be seen to 
violate the principle of equal treatment. As in Albemarle, how- 
ever, the Court's interpretative approach leaves substantial 
doubt that the result was reached by reference to an equal treat- 
ment purpose. The misgivings expressed in separate opinions by 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell suggest that it was not. 
While agreeing that seniority relief should be available, Jus- 
tice Powell, dissenting in part, did not agree with the Court's 
interpretation of section 706(g) as "presumptively" requiring 
retroactive seniority relief.l18 He argued that the Court improp- 
erly relied on language from and citations to lower court deci- 
sions contained in Committee Reports to the 1972 amend- 
ments,ll@ and he criticized the Court's heavy reliance on Labor 
Board practice.laO In conclusion, Justice Powell insisted that the 
Court's approach renders "largely meaningless the discretionary 
authority vested in district courts by 8 706(g) to weigh the equi- 
ties of the situation."lal 
114. See 29 U.S.C. 8 160(c) (1976). 
115. 422 US.  419-21 & n.11. See generally Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 880-84 
(1972). 
116. 424 U.S. 747 (1976). 
117. See id. at 766-70, 779; id. at 782 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissent- 
ing in part). 
118. Id. at 784-86, 788 n.6, 790-91, 796 n.18. 
119. Id. at 796 n.18. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 782. 
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B. The Equal Status Cases 
1. Formulation of a liability theory in disparate impact cases: 
Griggs and Albemarle 
As the Court's first definitive expression on the nature and 
scope of the Civil Rights Act's prohibition of racial discrimina- 
tion,l" Griggs u. Duke Power Co.12' has profoundly influenced 
the development of antidiscrimination law. Blacks in that case 
challenged the power company's requirement that applicants 
have a high school diploma or pass an intelligence test in order 
to be considered for employment or for transfer to higher paying 
jobs. The company contended that its testing practices were spe- 
cifically authorized under section 703(h) of the Civil Rights 
Act.lS4 Section 703(h) permits employers to use "any profession- 
ally developed ability test" that "is not designed, intended or 
used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or na- 
tional origin."lS6 The lower courts essentially adopted an equal 
treatment interpretation of the Act by holding that job qualifi- 
cation criteria which were fairly applied to all racial groups and 
which were implemented without an intent to discriminate 
against minority employees would not be invalidated merely be- 
cause a disproportionate number of minority applicants failed to 
satisfy the criteria.lp6 
The Supreme Court, however, took an equal status ap- 
proach. "[Glood intent or absence of discriminatory intent" was 
essentially irrelevant, inasmuch as "Congress directed the thrust 
of the [Civil Rights] Act to the consequences of employment 
practices, not simply the motivation."ln Reversing the lower 
courts, the Supreme Court formulated a two-part theory of lia- 
bility for disparate impact cases under title VII. First, the plain- 
tifF had to show that the challenged employment practice had a 
disproportionate impact on minority groups. Because the Civil 
122. Blumrosen, Employment Discrimination, supra note 14, at 62. 
123. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
124. Id. at 427-28, 433. 
125. Section 703(h) provides in pertinent part: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to give and to act upon the 
results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its 
administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to 
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. $ 2000e-2(h) (1976). 
126. 401 US.  at 428-29. 
127. Id. at 432 (emphasis in original). 
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Rights Act "proscribes not only overt discrimination but also 
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in opera- 
t i ~ n , " l ~ ~  a showing of disproportionate impact established a 
prima facie case of liability. Second, the Court held that "Con- 
gress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any 
given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the em- 
ployment in question."lge 
In establishing the relevance of disproportionate impact evi- 
dence to title VII law, the Court reasoned that the objective of 
Congress in the enactment of title VII was plain from the lan- 
guage of the stat*: "It was to achieve equality of employment 
opportunities . . . . ' "Equality," however, required not 
merely race neutral treatment, but race conscious treatment, i.e., 
"the posture and condition of the jobseeker [must] be taken into 
Since, as the Court noted, the fact that whites per- 
formed better on the tests than blacks "appear[s] to be directly 
traceable to race,"lS2 the use of such tests was prima facie 
unlawful. 
Aside from its interpretation of the legislative objective, the 
Court's definition of a prima facie case may have been influ- 
enced by the EEOC's construction of the Civil Rights Act.lS3 In 
its Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures,lM the EEOC 
states that "[tlhe use of any test which adversely affects hiring 
. . . constitutes discrimination unless . . . the test has been vali- 
dated."lS5 " [Hligher rejection rates for minority candidates than 
128. Id. at  431. 
129. Id. at  432. 
130. Id. at  429. 
131. Id. at  430-31. 
132. Id. at  430. The Court found that the disproportionate impact evidence adduced 
in the case was directly related to prior societal discrimination. 
133. See T. EASTLAND & W. BENNETT, supra note 11, a t  11-12; N. GLAZER, supra 
note 11, a t  51-57. See generally Note, Testing for Special Skills in Employment: A New 
Approach to Judicial Review, 1976 DUKE L. J. 596; Note, Application of the EEOC 
Guidelines to Employment Testing Validation: A Uniform Standard for Both Public 
and Private Employers, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 505 (1972). 
134. 29 C.F.R. g 1607 (1979). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, cre- 
ated by the Civil Righta Act in 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, g 705, 78 Stat. 258 (1964) 
(codified a t  42 U.S.C. 8 2000e-4 (1976)), was not given authority to promulgate substan- 
tive regulations. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 US. 125, 141 & n.20 (1976); 42 
U.S.C. 5 2000e-12 (1976). The Commission formulated its first set of employment testing 
guidelines, without seeking public comment, in 1966. Seelman, supra note 32, at 4 & 
n.21. The guidelines were subsequently revised-again without cornmentiin 1970. Id. at  
4. 
135. 29 C.F.R. 8 1607.3 (1979). 
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nonminority candidates" are an indication of "possible discrimi- 
nation."lS6 Validation requires proof "that the test is predictive 
of or significantly correlated with important elements of work 
behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for 
which candidates are being evaluated."lS7 Accordingly, the Su- 
preme Court expressly approved the EEOC's validation require- 
ment.ls8 Relying on the canon that administrative interpreta- 
tions by an enforcing agency are entitled to "great deference," 
the Court found that the section's language and "legislative his- 
tory support[ed] the Commission's construction, . . . afford[ing] 
good reason to treat the guidelines as expressing the will of 
Congress."1S@ 
In Albemarle, the Court refined the Griggs two-step theory 
of liability. The Court defined the prima facie case as a showing 
by "the complaining party or class . . . that the tests in question 
select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern signifi- 
cantly different from that of the pool of applicants."140 In step 
136. Id. § 1607.4(a). 
137. Id. $ 1607.4(c). In addition to validity, the EEOC also ruled that procedures 
having a disparate impact would be deemed to be unlawful unless they "evidence[d] a 
high degree of utility" and "the person giving or acting upon the results of the particular 
test [could] demonstrate that alternative suitable hiring, transfer or promotion proce- 
dures [were] unavailable for his use." Id. 1607.3. According to Seelman, the EEOC 
guidelines do not compare with the statute they interpret. Seelman, supra note 32, at 10- 
39. 
138. 401 U.S. at 433 n.9, 436. 
139. Id. a t  434. The Court also stated that "[flrom the sum of the legislative history 
relevant in this case, the conclusion is inescapable that the EEOC's construction of § 
703(h) to require that employment tests be job related comports with congressional in- 
tent." Id. at 436. 
140. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 US. 405, 425 (1975). Accord, General Elec. 
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 US. 125, 136-37 & n.14 (1976). In these cases, the Court essentially 
adopted the EEOC standard. 
The cases following Griggs and Albemarle suggest that statistical proof alone of ad- 
verse impact can establish a prima facie case. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 
136 (1977); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United 
States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). But see Seelman, supra note 32, a t  52 n.232 ("[Wlhether 
adverse impact evidence alone is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of unlawful 
discrimination in a case involving the more common kinds of selection factors is still a 
question which the Court must decide finally."). 
The only authority the Albemarle Court cited in support of its definition of a prima 
facie case in a disparate impact context was McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792, 802 (1973). 422 U.S. at 425. McDonnell Douglas was a disparate treatment case. 
Consequently, it  did not decide whether evidence of disparate impact establishes prima 
facie liability under title VII. The Griggs analysis of 5 703(h) focused on the job-related- 
ness issue. Relying on the Clark-Case Memorandum, Griggs held that title VII required 
the employer to show that the test has "a manifest relationship to the employment in 
question." 401 U.S. a t  432, 434. The fact that title VII permits employers to use tests 
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two, the burden shifts to the employer to show job-related- 
ness.141 In the event the employer meets this burden, the Court 
added a third step: "[Ilt remains open to the complaining party 
to show that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly 
undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legiti- 
mate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship.' "14' 
which measure "applicable job qualifications," id. at  434 n.11, does not mean that a title 
VII plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination merely by showing that pro- 
portionately fewer blacks than whites can meet the applicable standards. Indeed, in the 
paragraph immediately preceding the one on which the Court relies, Senator Case noted 
the following: 
Whatever its merit as a socially desirable objective, title VII would not 
require, and no court could read title VII as requiring, an employer to lower or 
change the occupational qualifications he sets for his employees simply because 
proportionately fewer Negroes than whites are able to meet them. Thus, it 
would be ridiculous, indeed, in addition to being contrary to title VII, for a 
court to order an employer . . . to lower his requirements . . . because . . . 
prior cultural or educational deprivation of Negroes prevented them from 
qualifying. 
110 CONG. REC. 7246-47 (1964). And in the sentence immediately following that quoted 
by the Court, the Senator stated that "Title VII would in no way interfere with the right 
of an employer to fix job qualifications." Id. at 7247. 
However, Senator Clark did not deny that testa might be used as a pretext for racial 
discrimination. Yet he emphasized that traditional disparate treatment standards gov- 
erned such practices. Where "it could be demonstrated that such tests were used for the 
purpose of discriminating against an individual because of his race," then the Act would 
proscribe their use. "[Ilt is not enough," however, "that the effect of using a particular 
test is to favor one group above another, to produce a violation of the act; an act of 
discrimination must be taken with regard to an individual, 'because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, or national origin.' " Id. at 9107 (emphasis added). See also Seelman, 
supra note 32, at 50. 
The Court also relied on the fact that Senator Tower's original amendment author- 
izing " 'professionally developed ability tests' " was rejected because, as Senator Case put 
it, it might allow employers to use tests as a "guise" for discrimination. 401 U.S. at  435 
(quoting 110 CONG. REC. 13,504 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Case)). In opposing the amend- 
ment, however, the senators supporting enactment of the civil rights bill did not advo- 
cate a change in the traditional burden of proof. See SOVERN, supra note 30, at 71-73; 
Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOK- 
LYN L. REV. 62,71 (1965); Bonfield, supra note 30, at  955-58; Gardner, The Development 
of the Substantive Principles of Title VII Law: The Defendant's Views, 26 ALA. L. REV. 
1, 55-80 (1973); Lamb, Proof of Discrimination at the Commission Level, 39 TEMP. L.Q. 
299, 301 (1966); Seelman, supra note 32, at  42-62. As Senator Humphrey stated, these 
tests "are legal unless used for the purpose of discrimination." 110 CONG. REc. 13504 
(1964) (emphasis added). 
141. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. a t  425. 
142. Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)). In 
Albemarle, the Court also stated that proof of suitable alternative selection criteria 
would constitute evidence that the employer was using its tests merely as a "pretext" for 
discrimination. Id. McDonnell Douglas defined the process of proving pretext as follows: 
"In short, on the retrial respondent must be given a full and fair opportunity to demon- 
strate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were 
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The liability issue in Albemarle concerned only the question 
of what an employer must show "to establish that pre-employ- 
ment tests . . . are sufficiently 'job related' to survive challenge 
under Title VII."14s In answering this question, the Court again 
endorsed, virtually without modification, the EEOC's construc- 
tion of title VII.144 
Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment, warned that 
"a too-rigid application of the EEOC Guidelines" might lead to 
"a subjective quota system of employment selection," a result 
"far from the intent of Title VII." He suggested that the guide- 
lines deserved only "that deference normally due agency state- 
ments based on agency experience and expertise."14' 
Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, would have accorded even 
less deference to the EEOC standards for proving job related- 
ness: "[S]lavish adherence to the EEOC Guidelines regarding 
test validation should not be required; those provisions are, as 
their title suggests, guides entitled to the same weight as other 
well-founded testimony by experts in the field of employment 
testing."146 The Chief Justice also noted that the Griggs en- 
dorsement of the guidelines extended only to the proposition 
that tests must be demonstrated to be job related under section 
703(h), not to the EEOC's "methods for proving job related- 
ness." The EEOC's definition of test discrimination, he asserted, 
"interpret[s] no section of Title VII and [is] nowhere referred to 
in its legislative history."147 
2. Washington v. Davis: retreat from equal status? 
In Washington u. Davis,14' police department applicants in 
- the District of Columbia alleged that Test 21, a test designed to 
measure verbal ability, vocabulary, reading, and comprehension, 
had a highly discriminatory impact in screening out black appli- 
in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision." 411 U.S. at 805. Accord, Dothard 
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-30 (1977). 
In its guidelines, the EEOC placed the burden of showing that "alternative suitable 
hiring, transfer or promotion procedures are unavailable for [the employer's] use" on the 
employer. 29 C.F.R. 5 1607.3 (1979). The Court's dictum on the suitable alternative bur- 
den appears to have rejected this approach. 
143. 422 U.S. at 408. 
144. See id. at 430-36. 
145. Id. at 449. 
146. Id. at 452. 
147. Id. at 451-52 (emphasis in original). 
148. 426 US. 229 (1976). 
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cants and bore no relationship to job performance. The test was 
developed by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and was gen- 
erally used throughout the federal service. Plaintiffs claimed 
that use of the test violated their fifth amendment rights.14@ The 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, applying the 
Griggs rationale, held that proof of disproportionate impact 
alone was sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.150 In a 
landmark decision, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
proof of discriminatory purpose was required in actions brought 
under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.151 
The Court appeared to retreat from the wholehearted en- 
dorsement it had given the EEOC Guidelines in Albemarle. In 
promulgating testing guidelines, the CSC's interpretation of the 
Civil Rights Act had consistently tended to implement the equal 
treatment principle, while the EEOC's interpretation had 
tended toward equal status.lS2 In Washington v. Davis, the 
plaintiffs argued that the CSC's test had to meet the job-relat- 
edness standards developed under the EEOC guidelines,15s 
which required evidence that test performance relate to success 
on the job? The defendants argued, on the other hand, that 
the guidelines developed by the CSC, which permitted tests that 
predicted "[s]uccess in training,"lS5 were more consistent with 
title VI19s legislative intent.lM 
The court of appeals, persuaded that the EEOC interpreta- 
tion was correct, held that the defendants had failed to "satisfy 
what it deemed to be the crucial requirement of a direct rela- 
tionship between performance on Test 21 and performance on 
the policeman's job."lS7 The Supreme Court disagreed, noting 
149. Id. a t  233-36. 
150. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975), reu'd, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
Although title VII was then inapplicable to the Federal Government, the parties as- 
sumed they were subject to Civil Rights Act standards. Washington v. Davis, 428 U.S. a t  
238 n.8, 249 & n.15. The extent to which lower courts accepted this assumption is an 
indication of the influence Griggs has exerted in the development of antidiscrimination 
law. See id. a t  236 & n.6, 237, 238 & n.10, 244 & n.12. See generally Schwemm, From 
Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond: Discriminatory Purpose in Equal Protec- 
tion Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 961,987-1000, Burden of Proof, supra note 30, a t  1037- 
39. 
151. 426 U.S. a t  238-40. 
152. See Seelman, supra note 32, a t  3-9, 53-62. 
153. See id. at 26. 
154. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. a t  265 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
155. Id. a t  250 n.16. 
156. See id. a t  232 & n.1; Seelman, supra note 32, at 26. 
157. 426 U.S. at 249-50. 
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that the CSC's guidelines seemed "the much more sensible con- 
struction of the job-relatedness requirement."1sa 
Justice Brennan, dissenting, argued that the Court was re- 
treating from its earlier definition of discrimination, noting that 
the Court's holding was "distinctly opposed" to the EEOC's con- 
struction of title VI1.l" The Court's approach, he charged, con- 
tradicted the view of Congress' intent expressed in Griggs and 
Albemarle. Deference to the EEOC's interpretation was war- 
ranted, he argued, because Congress failed to alter or disapprove 
the guidelines in 1972 when it amended title V1I.l6O Finally, in 
support of his argument that the Court's interpretation was "in- 
consistent with clearly expressed Congressional intent," Justice 
Brennan relied on committee reports accompanying the 1972 
legislation. 161 
Although it did not purport to modify any Civil Rights Act 
precedents, Washington u. Davis represented a significant set- 
back to the complete implementation of the equal status value 
in antidiscrimination law. For the time being, at  least, the equal 
status tide seemed to be turning.16' 
158. Id. at  249-51. But see Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 142 n.4 (1977); 
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 & n.15, 334 n.19 (1977). 
The EEOC Guidelines came under further attack in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 
U.S. 125 (1976). In 1972, the EEOC promulgated a regulation requiring employers to 
include pregnancy-related disabilities in their employee health and disability insurance 
plans. In rejecting this rule, the Court noted that EEOC Guidelines were " 'not control- 
ling upon the courts by reason of their authority.' " The weight they should be given is 
dependent " 'upon the thoroughness evident in [their] consideration, the validity of 
[their] reasoning . . . and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking 
power to control.'" Id. at  142 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 
(1944)). See also Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,719 n.36 
(1978). 
The Court also rejected the EEOC Guidelines because they conflicted with regula- 
tions promulgated by the Wage and Hour Administrator. See 429 U.S. at  144-45. 
159. 426 U.S. at 266. 
160. Id. at  264. Deference was also due, he argued, because Congress recognized the 
need for expert assistance in the area of employment discrimination. Id. at  264 n.8. 
161. Id. at  268-69. 
162. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), International 
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), and United Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977) significantly retarded the full implementation of equal status. 
In General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), the Court upheld a disability 
plan challenged under f 703(a) of title VII, because it excluded disabilities arising from 
pregnancy from its coverage. The Court, analyzing Gilbert as a disparate treatment case, 
id. at  133-37, compared f 703(a)'s nondiscrimination prohibition with the fourteenth 
amendment's proscription against sex-related discrimination as interpreted in Geduldig 
v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). I t  noted the "similarities between the congressional lan- 
guage" of f 703(a) and cases construing the fourteenth amendment. I t  also noted that 
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3. Bakke and Weber: reaching the limits of equal status 
Although federal agencies had endorsed the concept of pref- 
erential treatment as early as the mid-l960'~,l~~ the Court did 
not squarely face the issue until 1978 and the case of Regents of 
the University of California v. Bakke.'" Before Bakke, signals 
respecting the Court's view on the controversial reverse discrimi- 
nation issue had been mixed.le6 The reason for this became ap- 
parent in Bakke. Justices Powell, Brennan, White, Marshall, 
and Blackmun concluded that title VI of the Civil Rights Act1- 
did not have independent statutory force, but proscribed only 
those racial classifications that would violate the equal protec- 
tion ~1ause . l~~  Consequently, for these five justices the ultimate 
because the concerns Congress manifested in enacting title VII were similar to the con- 
cerns manifested in the Court's interpretation of the fourteenth amendment, the Su- 
preme Court cases "afford an existing body of law" relevant to and helpful in interpret- 
ing 5 703(a). 429 U.S. at 133. At one point the Court virtually admitted that Congress 
incorporated constitutional (equal treatment) standards into title VII: 
The concept of "discrimination," of course, was well known a t  the time of 
the enactment of Title VII, having been associated with the Fourteenth 
Amendment for nearly a century, and carrying with it a long history of judicial 
construction. When Congress makes it  unlawful for an employer to "discrimi- 
nate . . . because of. . . sex . . .," without further explanation of its meaning, 
we should not readily infer that it  meant something different from what the 
concept of discrimination has traditionally meant. 
Id. a t  145 (citations omitted). Justice Brennan objected to this inference. Id. a t  153-54 & 
n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
163. See generally T. EASTLAND & W. BENNETT, supra note 11, at 11-12, 133-36. 
164. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Bakke has generated considerable commentary. See, e.g., 
Ely, The Supreme Court 1977 Term-Foreward: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 
92 HAW. L. REV. 5 (1978); Tribe, Perspectives on Bakke: Equal Protection, Procedural 
Fairness, or Structural Justice, 92 HAW. L. REV. 864 (1979); Voros, Three Views of 
Equal Protection: A Backdrop to Bakke, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV. 25. 
165. In the early disparate impact cases, the Court exhibited a willingness to con- 
sider the effects of historical discrimination in determining liability under the Civil 
Rights Act. See, eg., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. a t  430. In later cases, however, 
the Court emphasized that title VII focuses on the individuals, not classes. Los-Angeles 
Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978). Moreover, the Court had 
decided in 1976 that title VII "proscribes racial discrimination . . . against whites on the 
same terms as racial discrimination against non-whites." McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail 
Tramp. Co., 427 U.S. at 279. 
166. Bakke's original complaint alleged that the University of California's special 
admissions program violated title VI of the Civil Rights Act, as well as the equal protec- 
tion clause and the privileges and immunities clause of the California State Constitution. 
While the trial court based its decision on all three grounds, the California Supreme 
Court held for Bakke only on equal protection grounds. Consequently, the parties 
neither briefed nor argued the applicability of title VI. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
requested the parties and the Justice Department to submit supplementary briefs on the 
statutory issue. See A. SINDLER, Bakke, DeFunis, AND MINORITY ADMISSIONS 259 (1978). 
167. 438 U.S. at 284-87 (Powell, J.); id. a t  328-55 (Brennan, J., concurring in part 
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meaning of the Civil Rights Act was not a question of statutory 
interpretation, but one of constitutional interpretation. Of these 
five, only Justice Powell's view of the constitution harmonized 
with the equal treatment value.168 Chief Justice Burger and Jus- 
tices Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist concluded that the Civil 
Rights Act "may independently proscribe conduct that the Con- 
stitution does not," and therefore expressly adopted an equal 
treatment interpretation of the Act?* For these four justices, 
the meaning of the Civil Rights Act was a question of statutory 
interpretation. 
In support of their conclusion that title VI incorporated 
nothing more than a constitutional standard, Justices Powell 
and Brennan offered two arguments. First, they argued that 
"supporters of Title VI repeatedly declared that the bill enacted 
constitutional principles."170 Second, they noted that Congress 
refused to define the term "discrimination," favoring instead 
"broad language that could be shaped by experience, adminis- 
trative necessity, and evolving judicial doctrine."171 Therefore, 
Congress intended to delegate to the courts the task of updating 
the Act's meaning. 
Justice Stevens believed that the language of section 601 
was "perfectly clear,"172 i.e., "[nlo person in the United States 
shall, on the ground of race . . . be excluded from participation 
in . . . any program . . . receiving Federal financial assis- 
t a n ~ e . " l ~ ~  The university excluded Bakke because of his race. It 
received federal financial assistance; therefore, in Justice Ste- 
vens' view, "[tlhe plain language of the statute" resolved the is- 
sue: "A different result cannot be justified unless that language 
misstates the actual intent of the Congress that enacted the 
statute . . . ."17' After examining the statute's cbntext,lT6 its leg- 
and dissenting in part). 
168. See id. at 287-305 (Powell, J.). 
169. Id. at  417 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
170. 438 U.S. at  285 (Powell, J.); accord, id. at  328-36 (Brennan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
171. Id. at  337; accord, id. at  286-87 (Powell, J.). 
172. Id. at  414 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
173. 42 U.S.C. 3 2000d (1976). 
174. 438 U.S. at  412-13 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
175. "The statutory prohibition against discrimination in federally funded projects 
contained in 5 601 is more than a simple paraphrasing of . . . the Fifth or Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . [Section] 601 has independent force, with language and emphasis in 
addition to that found in the Constitution." Id. a t  416. 
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islative history,176 and the Supreme Court's prior interpretations 
of the Act, Justice Stevens concluded that nothing justified "the 
conclusion that the broad language of 5 601 should not be given 
its natural meaning."177 Implicit in Justice Stevens' analysis is 
an assumption that the doctrine of separation of powers requires 
courts to defer to the policy choices expressed through the dem- 
ocratic process: "As with other provisions of the Civil Rights 
Act, Congress' expression of its policy to end racial discrimina- 
tion may independently proscribe conduct the Constitution does 
not."178 He concluded that in such circumstances it was not the 
Court's task in interpreting the statute, " 'to consider whether 
Congress [in 19641 was mistaken' " in its view of equality; 
" '[rlather, we must construe the statute in light of the impres- 
sions under which Congress did in fact act.' "17@ 
Responding to Justice Stevens' analysis, Justice Brennan of- 
fered an additional reason for rejecting the argument that Con- 
gress intended to enact an independent and "colorblind" rule of 
statutory law. His argument proceeded essentially as follows: 
First Premise: "The legislative history of Title VI, as well 
as the statute itself, reveals a desire to induce voluntary com- 
pliance with the requirement of nondiscriminatory treatment." 
Second Premise: "[V]oluntary compliance with the re- 
quirement of nondiscriminatory treatment" involves "volun- 
tary efforts to eliminate the evil of racial discrimination." 
Third Premise: The elimination of the evil of racial dis- 
crimination compels the "use of race-conscious remedies to 
cure acknowledged or obvious statutory [and constitutional] 
violations." 
Fourth Premise: An equal treatment "reading of Title VI 
. . . would require recipients guilty of discrimination to await 
the imposition of [race-conscious] remedies by the Executive 
[or Judicial] Branch." 
Fifth Premise: "Surely Congress did not intend to . . . [re- 
quire] the recipient to await a judicial adjudication of [liabil- 
ity] and the judicial imposition of a racially oriented remedy." 
176. "[Nlothing in the legislative history justifies the conclusion that the broad lan- 
guage of 5 601 should not be given its natural meaning. We are dealing with a distinct 
statutory prohibition, enacted at a particular time with particular concerns in mind; 
neither its language nor any prior interpretation suggests that its place in the Civil 
Rights Act, won after long debate, is simply that of a constitutional appendage." Id. at 
418. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 417. 
179. Id. at 416 n.18 (quoting Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693,709 (1973)). 
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Conclusion: Therefore, title VI permits recipients of fed- 
eral funds to exclude persons on racial grounds from their pro- 
grams in order to cure acknowledged violations of the Act.lBO 
On the face of the argument, it is not apparent that Con- 
gress' intent to induce voluntary compliance with title VI's re- 
quirement of "nondiscriminatory treatment" (first premise) is 
equivalent to an intent to induce individual recipients of federal 
funds to grant preferential treatment (second and third prem- 
ises). Consequently, Justice Brennan simply asserts that the two 
are equivalent (fifth premise). In essence, Justice Brennan's vol- 
untary compliance argument does no more than beg the ultimate 
question-what did Congress intend? 
In the final analysis, Justice Brennan's interpretative ap- 
proach rests on a presumption that "remedial statutes designed 
to eliminate discrimination against racial minorities" contain an 
equal status purpose.181 Therefore, whenever a literal application 
of the statutory language would lead to results directly contrary 
to this purpose, that application "must fail."18' Concededly, his 
formulation of purpose is not without support, particularly in 
the sources on which he relies most heavily-judicial decisions 
and executive and congressional action subsequent to the enact- 
ment of the Civil Rights Act.lSS In this respect, Justice Bren- 
nan's opinion in Bakke, more than any of the Civil Rights Act 
decisions to date, contains a fully elaborated application of an 
interpretative theory involving contemporaneous construction.lM 
180. 438 U.S. at 336-37 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Contrary to Justice Brennan's equal status approach, Justice Powell argued that abroga- 
tion of equal treatment's due process limitations would "convert a remedy heretofore 
reserved for violations of legal rights into a privilege that all institutions throughout the 
Nation could grant at their pleasure to whatever groups are perceived as victims of socie- 
tal discrimination." Id. a t  310. See also id. a t  296 & n.36. Cf. United Steelworkers v. 
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 218-19 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Voluntary compliance" 
not equivalent to preferential treatment). 
181. 438 U.S. at 355 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
182. Id. a t  340. In formulating the purpose of the Act, Justice Brennan relies heavily 
on subsequent congressional and executive action. See id. at 341-50. The conclusion that 
the Act authorizes preferential treatment follows automatically from the assumption that 
it embodies an equal status value. See id. a t  336, 366-68 & n.42. 
183. Id. a t  341-55. 
184. Contemporaneous construction techniques were also utilized by some justices 
in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 390-94 (1977) (Mar- 
shall, J., dissenting); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 154-60 (1976) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 268-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763-70 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405,418-23,433-36 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,433- 
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Justice Brennan also utilized a presumption favoring equal 
status in United Steelworkers v. Weber.la6 Weber, a white pro- 
duction worker, challenged an affirmative action plan included 
in a master collective bargaining agreement entered into by Kai- 
ser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation and the United Steel- 
workers of America. The plan required that at least fifty percent 
of the trainees accepted into Kaiser's craft training program be 
black. Since trainees were selected by seniority, the plan re- 
quired the maintenance of separate seniority lists for black and 
white workers. Consequently, several of the most junior black 
trainees selected for the program had less seniority than several 
white production workers whose bids for admission were re- 
j e ~ t e d . ~  Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, noted that sec- 
tions 703(a) and (d) of title VII "make it unlawful to 'discrimi- 
nate . . . because of . . . race' in hiring and in the selection of 
apprentices for training programs." However, because "a literal 
interpretation" would conflict with the "purpose of the stat- 
~ t e , " ' ~ ~  Justice Brennan relied on the "rule that a thing may be 
within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, 
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its mak- 
e r ~ . " ~ ~ ~  The Court found that the purpose of the statute was to 
promote the "integration of blacks into the mainstream of 
American society."18@ This could be accomplished through vol- 
untary race-conscious efforts to improve the " 'relative position 
of the Negro worker' " in American society.leO The Court bol- 
stered its finding of purpose by examining the language and leg- 
islative history of Section 703(j),lB1 which analysis essentially 
follows Justice Brennan's voluntary compliance argument in 
Bakke. 
Justice Blackmun, concurring, virtually admitted that the 
Court's interpretation abrogated the legislative "bargain struck 
when Title VII was enacted"lB" by lowering the threshold for 
- - -- 
34 (1971). 
185. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). See Neuborne, Observations on Weber, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
546, 554-56 (1979). 
186. 443 U.S. at 199. 
187. Id. at 201-02. 
188. Id. at 201 (quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 
(1892)). 
189. Id. at 202. 
190. Id. (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 6547 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)). 
191. Id. at 204-08. 
192. Id. at 213. 
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permissible remedial treatment and expanding the measure of 
the remedy even beyond the bounds established in the Court's 
prior holdings. Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun joined the 
Court's opinion as well as its judgment in the belief that "addi- 
tional considerations, practical and equitable, only partially per- 
ceived, if perceived at all, by the 88th Congress, support the con- 
clusion reached by the Court."lB8 
The Court measured an individual's elibigility for preferen- 
tial treatment, Justice Blackmun observed, "solely in terms of a 
statistical disparity."lW Employers would be authorized under 
the Court's formula to prefer minorities whenever a job category 
had been "traditionally segregated."lM According to Justice 
Blackmun, 
the Court considers a job category to be "traditionally segre- 
gated" when there has been a societal history of purposeful ex- 
clusion of blacks from the job category, resulting in a persis- 
tent disparity between the proportion of blacks in the labor 
force and the proportion of blacks among those who hold jobs 
within the category.lB6 
In other words, mere evidence of statistical disparity conclu- 
sively authorized remedial measures.lm Even the cases following 
Griggs, which indicate that disparate impact evidence alone may 
establish a prima facie case of liability,lM did not go this far. 
Moreover, as Justice Blackmun observed, the Court further re- 
duced the threshold by allowing disparate impact to be proved 
by comparison of the composition of the employer's workforce 
with "the composition of the labor force as a whole, in which 
minorities are more heavily represented," rather than the tradi- 
tional requirement of a comparison with the composition of the 
pool of workers who meet valid job qualifications.lBB 
In addition, Justice Blackmun commented, the Court ex- 
panded the scope of the statute's remedial provisions by author- 
izing remedial measures that lie "wholly outside the bounds of 
193. Id. at 209. Justice Blackmun advocates a theory of "arguable violations" which 
would allow an employer to institute preferential treatment "whether or not a court . . . 
could order the same step as a remedy." Id. 
194. Id. at 213. 
195. Id.; see id. at 209 & n.9. 
196. Id. at 212. 
197. Id. at 212-15. 
198. See note 140 supra. 
199. 443 U.S. at 214 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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Title VIL"200 For example, under the Court's holding, preferen- 
tial treatment may be afforded on the basis of discrimination 
which entirely predates the Act,M1 notwithstanding the Court's 
prior cases holding that title VII provides no remedy for pre-Act 
dis~rimination.~~~ More significantly, however, the Court for the 
first time under the statute upheld the principle of preferential 
treatment.'OS Trainees selected for Kaiser's craft program were 
not identified victims of discrimination, but were selected solely 
because of membership in the disadvantaged class.204 
Justice Blackmun attempted to allay misgivings about the 
Court's statutory interpretation by noting that "if the Court has 
misperceived the political will, it has the assurance that because 
the question is statutory Congress may set a different course if it 
so chooses."20s Chief Justice Burger suggested, however, that in 
failing to defer to the legislative will, the Court had exceeded the 
limits of its constitutional auth~ri ty. '~ The Chief Justice and 
Justice Rehnquist charged, in essence, that in order to achieve 
"what it regards as a desirable result,"207 the Court read into the 
Civil Rights Act a "purpose" entirely at variance with the pur- 
pose as conceived by the 88th Congress.208 Justice Rehnquist de- 
scribed these two conflicting purposes-the contemporary pur- 
pose as conceived by the Court and the original congressional 
purpose-as follows: 
There is perhaps no device more destructive to the notion 
of equality than the numerus clausus-the quota. Whether de- 
scribed as "benign discrimination" or "affirmative action," the 
racial quota is nonetheless a creator of castes, a two-edged 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309-10 (1977); In- 
ternational Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
203. See 443 U.S. a t  225 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But see Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. a t  363-66 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (upholding preferential treatment under fourteenth amendment). 
204. See 443 U.S. at 198-99. 
205. Id. a t  216 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
206. Id. a t  218 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). "The Court reaches a result I would be 
inclined to vote for were I a Member of Congress considering a proposed amendment of 
Title VII. I cannot join the Court's judgment, however, because it is contrary to the 
explicit language of the statute and arrived a t  by means wholly incompatible with long- 
established principles of separation of powers." Id. a t  216. 
207. Id. a t  216. The Court, according to the dissenters, in effect concluded that 
adopting an equal status interpretation of title VII was the only "fair" interpretation of 
the Act. 
208. Id. a t  230-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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sword that must demean one in order to prefer another. In 
passing Title VII Congress outlawed all racial discrimination, 
recognizing that no discrimination based on race is benign, that 
no action disadvantaging a person because of his color is 
afJirmative.*Og 
The interpretative approach urged by the dissent relies 
principally on the language of the statute. Justice Rehnquist, for 
example, cited the rule that " '[wlhen words are free from doubt 
they must be taken as the final expression of the legislative in- 
tent, and are not to be added to or subtracted from by consider- 
ations drawn . . . from any extraneous source.""1° Conse- 
quently, legislative history provides only secondary evidence of 
congressional intent, and then principally to resolve difficulties 
caused by "imprecise drafting or because legislative com- 
promises have produced genuine ambiguities."211 This approach 
accords with Justice Stevens' interpretation of title VI in Bakke, 
which reached a similar equal treatment interpretation of the 
Civil Rights Act. In these two most recent pronouncements by 
the Court, where the inclination to expand the reach of the 
equal status value has appeared more strongly than before, the 
division over the proper interpretative approach to the Civil 
Rights Act has been the most dramatic. 
Principles of statutory construction influence the definition 
of substantive rights guaranteed under the Civil Rights Act in 
much the same way the Court's equal protection analysis defines 
the scope of the substantive rights guaranteed under the four- 
teenth amendment.212 Unlike the field of constitutional law, 
however, "we lack a fully developed, modern theory of the judi- 
cial role in interpreting statutes."21s As one commentator has 
noted: 
209. Id. at 254. 
210. Id. at 228 n.9 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 US.  470, 490 (1917)). 
211. Id. at 217 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist noted that he had ex- 
amined the legislative history in order to "expose the magnitude of the Court's misinter- 
pretation of Congress' intent." Id. at 231. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
212. See, e.g., Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing 
Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAW. L. REV. 1 (1972). 
213. Gerwirtz, The Courts, Congress, and the Executive Policymaking: Notes on 
Three Doctrines, 40 L. & CONTEMP. ROB. 46, 65 (1976). See also 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES 
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.13 (4th ed. 1973). 
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Such a theory, of course, would inquire into the various ways 
courts identify legislative purpose by examining text, legisla- 
tive history, etc. But it would also identify, evaluate and pro- 
pose policies, external to the legislative purpose identified from 
text and immediate context, which enter into the judicial activ- 
ity of interpretation-policies which shape the meaning given 
to a statute even when those policies cut somewhat against the 
legislative purpose narrowly defined. That such external poli- 
cies (sometimes embodied in so-called canons or principles of 
statutory construction) do influence the construction given 
statutes cannot be doubted . . . . ,9214 . 
Although not always expressly articulated, it is apparent in the 
cases reviewed above that certain external policies have influ- 
enced the construction of the Civil Rights Act. Professor 
Neuborne suggests that these policies are "determined by reign- 
ing political theory."21s These policies become apparent in re- 
viewing the characteristic interpretative approaches adopted by 
the Court's equal status and equal treatment advocates. This is 
the subject of part A below. Part B indicates how the conflicting 
policies summarized in part A rest on competing assumptions 
about the roles of the legislature and judiciary in formulating 
civil rights policy. 
A. Interpreting the Civil Rights Act: Original Versus 
Current Understanding 
1. Ascertaining the original understanding 
The most distinctive feature of the interpretative approach 
exhibited in the equal treatment opinions is a decided deference 
to the intentions of the original draftsmen. This is not deter- 
mined solely, nor even primarily, by reference to the legislative 
history, since the same parts of it are sometimes cited by mem- 
bers of the Court to support conflicting conclusions about the 
Civil Rights Act's meaning.m6 Rather, the language and struc- 
ture of the statute is foremost in the analysis of the equal treat- 
ment proponents. This was particularly apparent in Justice 
Rehnquist's opinion in Weber, which relied on the canon, de- 
214. Gerwirtz, supra note 213, at 65. 
215. Neuborne, supra note 185, at 555 n.32. 
216. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 286 (Powell, J.); id. at 
332-33 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 418 n.21 (Stevens, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting statement by Sen. Humphrey, 110 
CONC. REC. 6544 (1964)). 
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scribed in Caminetti u. United States, that "the meaning of a 
statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in 
which the act is framed, and if that is plain . . . the sole func- 
tion of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.'%'' 
References to the "plain meaning" or "plain language" of 
the statute were made by Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
Rehnquist in WebeP8 and by Justice Stevens in Bakke."@ Their 
analysis reveals, however, that they were not referring to the so- 
called "rule of literal meaning" under which "a judge puts on 
blinders, so to speak, in order to obscure from view everything 
but just the text of the statute whose effect on the matter at 
issue is in question."220 On the contrary, their approach seeks to 
ascertain and apply the meaning intended by the legislature, 
even though another interpretation might be more desirable or 
confer greater benefits on the statute's intended beneficiarie~.~~' 
This is accomplished not merely by examination of the immedi- 
ately applicable section, but by reference to the section's statu- 
tory context. Justice Powell made the point in Franks, for exam- 
ple, that read alongside other sections of title VII, the language 
of section 706(g) indicates that competitive-type seniority 
should not be granted indi~criminately.~'~ 
Another feature of this approach is the reluctance to give 
great weight to subsequent interpretations made by administra- 
tive agencies, legislative committees, or courts whose views do 
not comport with the statute's original meaning. Justice Black- 
mun, for example, objected in Albemarle to "the Court's appar- 
ent view that absolute compliance with the EEOC Guidelines is 
a sine qua non of pre-employment test validation."228 In addi- 
tion, Chief Justice Burger charged that the Court misapplied 
Griggs in according the guidelines " 'great deference.' "224 Simi- 
lar skeptical treatment of administrative interpretations was ex- 
217. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). 
218. 443 U.S. at 217 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 230 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
219. 438 U.S. at 412 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see id. 
at 414 (language of section "is perfectly clear"); id. at 418 (meaning of statute "is crystal 
clear") (language should be given its "natural meaning"). 
220. 2A C. SANDS, supm note 213, 8 46.02. 
221. See R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION A D APPLICATION OF STATUTES 231-32 
(1975). 
222. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 791-93 & n.9 (1976). 
223. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 449 (1975) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring). 
224. Id. a t  451-52 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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hibited by Justice Powell in Franks,226 by the Court in Team- 
s t e r~ , "~  and by Justice Stevens in Bakke.la7 Likewise, in Franks 
and Teamsters, equal treatment proponents gave short shrift to 
legislative materials generated in 1972 which purported to mod- 
ify or reinterpret the 1964 Act.22s In Teamsters, for instance, 
notwithstanding over thirty decisions by six courts of appeals to 
the contrary, the Court refused to extend the Griggs rationale to 
alleviate the discriminatory effects that resulted from the utili- 
zation of a bona fide seniority system.229 
2. Assigning the current understanding 
Reliance on postenactment developments is one of the most 
distinctive features of the interpretative approach that charac- 
terizes an equal status analysis. The principal materials and ca- 
nons that have been relied on to support an equal status inter- 
pretation of the Civil Rights Act are administrative 
interpretations, reenactment after contemporaneous interpreta- 
tion, legislative silence as implied approval of a contemporane- 
ous interpretation, legislative interpretations of prior enact- 
ments, interpretation by reference to related statutes, and 
equity of the statute. 
a. Administrative interpretations. Section 602 of title 
VIaSO and section 713 of title VIIaS1 authorized certain federal 
departments and agencies to issue regulations to "effectuate" 
and "carry out" respective provisions of the Civil Rights Act. 
These delegations were bitterly contested by certain members of 
Congres~,'~~ who accurately predicted that the agencies would 
225. 424 U.S. 747, 796-99 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
226. The majority of the Court in Teamsters ignored Justice Marshall's citation to 
"an unbroken line of cases" in which the EEOC had concluded that "Q 703(h) did not 
immunize seniority systems that perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination." 431 U.S. 
a t  378-80 & n.4 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
227. 438 U.S. 265, 418 n.22 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
228. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 
(1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 796 n.18 (1976) (Powell, J., concur- 
ring in part and dissenting in part). 
229. See 431 U.S. 324, 378 & n.2 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dis- 
senting in part). 
230. 42 U.S.C. Q 2000d-1 (1976). 
231. Id. Q 2000e-12 (1976). 
232. See, e.g., 110 CONC. REC. 5253 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Talmadge); id. a t  5863- 
65 (remarks of Sen. Eastland); id. a t  5606-7 (remarks of Sen. Ervin). 
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exceed the congressional intent in implementing the "objectives 
of the ~ta tu te ."~~~egula t ions  and decisions promulgated by two 
agencies in particular have played a prominent role in the inter- 
pretation of the Civil Rights Act: those of the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) and those of the EEOC. 
In Bakke, Justice Brennan relied extensively on HEW regu- 
lations that were promulgated in 1973.2M The regulations pro- 
vide that recipients of federal funds "may properly give special 
consideration to race, color, or national origin to make the bene- 
fits of its program more widely available to such groups, . . . 
[elven in the absence of . . . prior discrirninati~n."~~~ These 
views, Justice Brennan argued, as well as the views of the Solici- 
tor General, who was charged by the President with enforcement 
powers under title VI, "are entitled to considerable deference in 
construing" the statute.286 
HEW regulations were also heavily relied upon in Lau v. 
Nichols,237 a title VI disparate impact case challenging the San 
Francisco school system's failure to provide English language in- 
struction to students of Chinese ancestry. The Court held, on 
the basis of the regulation, that since the failure to provide lan- 
guage instruction had the effect of discriminating between En- 
glish-speaking and Chinese-speaking students, the Board of Ed- 
ucation was obligated under title VI to correct the deficiency.'= 
Significantly, in Bakke, Justice Brennan cited Lau for the pro- 
position that title VI allows the voluntary use of race to remedy 
"the lingering effects of past societal discriminati~n."~~~ 
The Court also gave substantial deference to EEOC inter- 
pretations of title VII in Griggs, Albemarle, and Dothard v. 
R a w l i n ~ o n . ~ ~ ~  In addition, Justices Brennan and Marshall 
strongly objected to the Court's failure to defer to the EEOC's 
point of view in General Electric Co. u. Gilbertu1 and 
233. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 244 n.23 (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting). 
234. See 438 U.S. a t  341-45 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
235. 45 C.F.R. $8 80.3(b)(6)(ii), 80.5Cj) (1979). 
236. 438 U.S. at 342, 345 n.19 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
237. 414 U.S. 563 (1974). See generally D. H o ~ o w ~ n ,  THE COURTS AND SOC~AL POL- 
ICY, 15-17 (1977). 
238. 414 U.S. at 567-69. 
239. 438 U.S. at 352 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
240. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 
U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
241. 429 U.S. 125, 155-58 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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Teamst 
b. Reenactment after contemporaneous interpretation. 
Congress expanded the EEOC's enforcement powers in 1972, au- 
thorizing it to prevent unlawful employment practices as defined 
in sections 703 and 704 of the 1964 Act.24s Justice Marshall ar- 
gued in Teamsters that Congress "effectively re-enacted [sec- 
tions 703 and 7041 and the judicial gloss that had been placed on 
them."244 He referred specifically to lower court decisions finding 
that seniority systems which perpetuated the effects of past dis- 
crimination were unlawful. Of course, as Justice Marshall's use 
of the word "virtually" implies, Congress did not "re-enact" title 
VII's prohibiting sections in the 1972 Equal Employment Op- 
portunity Act. It amended them, adding "applicants" for em- 
ployment and union membership to the persons protected under 
section 703, and adding "joint labor-management committees 
controlling . . . training programs" to those subject to the 
prohibitions of section 704. In Albemarle, the Court utilized the 
reenactment canon in determining that "backpay may be 
awarded on a class basis under Title VII without exhaustion of 
administrative procedures by the unnamed class members."246 
There, however, Congress had expressly reenacted title VII's 
backpay provision.246 
c. Legislative silence as implied approval of a contempo- 
raneous interpretation. Justice Brennan cited the rule in Bakke 
that "the construction of a statute by those charged with its exe- 
cution is particularly deserving of respect where Congress has 
directed its attention to the administrative construction and left 
it unaltered."247 Justice Brennan noted that in 1977 Congress 
considered an amendment to the HEW appropriations bill 
which would have restricted the remedial use of race in federal 
programs. However, the amendment "did not challenge the right 
of federally funded educational institutions to voluntarily ex- 
tend preference to racial minorities."248 Therefore, he concluded, 
242. 431 U.S. 324, 390-91 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
243. Equal Employment Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 92-261, $ 5, 86 Stat. 107 
(1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 8 2000e-6(c), (d), (e) (1976)). 
244. 431 U.S. 324, 393 n.24 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). See 2A C. SANDS, supra note 213, 5 49.09. 
245. 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975). 
246. Id. 
247. 438 US. at 346 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
248. Id. at 347. 
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HEW'S construction of title VI as permitting voluntary racial 
preferences is "particularly deserving of respect."249 
d. Legislative interpretations of prior enactments. In 
Franks,aS0 Tearn~ters,'~~ and B~kke ."~ Justices Brennan and 
Marshall relied on statements from Senate, House, and Confer- 
ence Committee Reports accompanying the 1972 amendments to 
title VII. However, these statements do not imply that the later 
Congress shared the same state of mind as the former. For ex- 
ample, the House Report states: 
During the preparation and presentation of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employment discrimination 
tended to be viewed as a series of isolated and distinguishable 
events, due, for the most part, to ill-will on the part of some 
identifiable individual or organization . . . . 
Employment discrimination, as we know today, is a far 
more complex and pervasive phenomenon. Experts familiar 
with the subject generally describe the problem in terms of 
"systems" and "effects" rather than simply intentional 
One Senator voiced the general intention that equal status inter- 
pretations be made of the Act, noting, for example, that "in any 
areas where a specific contrary intention is not indicated, it was 
assumed that the present case law . . . would continue to govern 
the applicability and construction of Title VII.''254 
e. Interpretation by reference to related statutes. Justice 
Brennan argued in Bakke that Congress' decision in 1977 to re- 
quire federal agencies to set aside ten pecent of all federal public 
work project funds for minority business enterprises "reflects a 
congressional judgment that the remedial use of race is permissi- 
ble under Title V1.''s66 And in Franks he cited extensively to 
interpretations of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).'" 
In that case, however, the evidence was clear that Congress 
modeled title VII's remedial provision after section 10(c) of the 
NLRA. 
249. Id. at 346. 
250. 424 U.S. 747, 764 n.21 (1976). 
251. 431 U.S. at 391-93 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
252. 438 U.S. at 353 n.28 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
253. H.R. REP. NO. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971). 
254. 118 CONG. REC. 7166 (1972) (statement of Sen. Williams read into the record). 
255. 438 U.S. at 349 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
256. 424 US. 747, 768-70 (1976). 
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f .  Equity of the statute. In addition to the postenactment 
developments summarized above, the equal status principle re- 
ceived substantial reinforcement in Weber and in Justice Bren- 
nan's Bakke opinion from the equity of a statute doctrine.267 
The Court stated the rule as follows: "[A] thing may be within 
the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because 
not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers."268 
It is true that a statute's context may indicate "a legislative 
purpose that is broader than the literal import of the words 
used."25@ In such cases, however, the meaning of the statute is 
broadened "only so far as the words have enough semantic lee- 
way to carry the broadened meaning. Beyond that, the legisla- 
tive purpose remains unrealized."260 Even if the context shows 
that the statute was intended to reach beyond the semantic lim- 
its of the words used, "[m]erely manifesting a broader legislative 
purpose is not enough."261 In other words, "determination of the 
equity or [spirit of a statute] involves an original problem of 
statutory interpretation for which all of the rules of construction 
may be useful."262 It is insdcient to merely assign a purpose 
and to apply it to the case at hand. Such an approach is tanta- 
mount to judicial lawmaking. 
B. Civil Rights Policy: Legislative Versus Judicial 
Supremacy 
Article I of the Constitution declares: "All legislative Powers 
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States 
. . . ."26s Thus, in addition to its historical and ideological 
roots:" the principle of legislative supremacy is expressly en- 
shrined in the Constitution. It is true that since Marbury u. 
Madison266 at least, the judiciary has asserted its power to "say 
what the law is."266 Therefore, in this limited sense, the judiciary 
257. R. DICKERSON, supra note 221, at 213-15; 2A C. SANDS, supra note 213,s 54.06. 
258. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) (quoting 
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)). 
R. DICKERSON, supra note 221, at 215. 
Id. 
Id. 
2A C.  SANDS, supra note 213, § 54.07. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, $1. 
See R. DICKERSON, supra note ,221, at 8 n.3. 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
Id. at 177. 
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exercises a legislative function.267 That Congress' legislative 
power is not exclusive, however, "in no wise detract[s] from the 
simple assertion that, within [constitutional limitations], any 
conflict between the legislative will and the judicial will must be 
resolved in favor of the former."P68 It is particularly significant, 
in the context of a discussion about equality, to note that the 
fundamental purpose underlying the separation of powers doc- 
trine is the maintenance of liberty. 
The implications of separation of powers in the statutory 
context are clear. If legislative supremacy in the creation of law 
is to be maintained, Professor Dickerson notes, "cognition" must 
precede "creation." Cognition involves the ascertainment of 
meaning; creation involves the assignment of meaning, or judi- 
cial lawmaking. "That differentiation is hard and the area of un- 
certainty wide offers no exemption from what appears to be a 
clear constitutional mandate."26e Notwithstanding the preemi- 
nent position the legislature had traditionally held under our 
system of government in formulating social policy, various argu- 
ments have been advanced justifying an expanded judicial role 
in implementing egalitarian principles. Believing that the courts 
are more able and ready to advance the cause of equality, egali- 
tarian theorists would institute a presumption favoring judicial 
creation, or lawmaking, in the interpretation of civil rights legis- 
lation, which would effectively replace legislative with judicial 
supremacy in the promulgation of civil rights policy. 
1. Impossibility of ascertaining legislative intent 
"[Mlany respectable scholars" have endorsed the notion 
that legislative intent is irrelevant, or that it does not exist at  
all.270 Consequently, the argument is made that it is unrealistic 
to derive from the legislative materials anything more than a 
"broad philosophical concept." It is presumed that because civil 
rights legislation generally embodies a "legislatively expanded 
vision of constitutional values," a presumption favoring applica- 
tion of this broad concept would operate in the same fashion as 
267. R. DICKERSON, supra note 221, at 13-28. 
268. Id. at 8. 
269. Id. at 20-21. 
270. Id. at 68 n.4. Professor Radin has stated that legislative intention is "undiscov- 
erable in any real sense" because "the chances that of several hundred men each will 
have the same determinate situation in mind . . . are infinitesimally small." Radin, Stat- 
utory Interpretation, 43 W v .  L. REV. 863, 870 (1930). 
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the "doctrine of clear statement" operates in constitutional law. 
In other words, the presumption of a broad civil rights policy 
such as equal status could be rebutted only by an explicit mani- 
festation of legislative intent indicating a narrower policy.271 
Justice Brennan adopted this approach in Bakke and Weber, 
justifying his application of the statute's ostensible "core pur- 
pose" with his view that the legislature had not "unequivocally 
ordered [him] not to."272 
While the concept of legislative intent has been frequently 
criticized, it has continued to have faithful adherents in the ju- 
diciary as well as in academia. In fact, Sutherland notes the 
following: 
An almost overwhelming majority of judicial opinions on statu- 
tory issues are written in the idiom of legislative intent. The 
reason for this doubtless lies in an assumption that an obliga- 
tion to construe statutes in such a way as to carry out the will 
. . . of the lawmaking branch of the government is mandated 
by principles of separation of powers.27s 
For this reason, a more careful examination of the concept is 
needed before rejecting it out of hand. 
According to Professor Dickerson, "intent" refers 
to the actual intent of some human being, or group of human 
beings, respecting what he or they intended to say. It  reflects 
the user's expectation that the reader or hearer will take the 
language as referring to what the user had in mind. It  is, there- 
fore, the specific message that the user intended to convey.274 
In reality, "legislative intent" is a figure of speech. Intention is a 
state of 'mind. Since only individuals, not legislatures, have 
minds, legislatures cannot have "intentions." Therefore, what is 
meant by legislative intent is not the collective attitude or view 
of a group of legislators, but the intention of a few members of 
the group, which is imputed to the rest who are engaged in the 
271. Neuborne, supra note 185, at 555 & n. 33. 
272. Id. at 554. 
273. 2A C. SANDS, supra note 213, 8 45.05. 
With respect to ascertaining title VII's meaning, Mr. Vaas has noted that "[s]eldom 
has similar legislation been debated with greater consciousness for the need for 'legisla- 
tive history' or with greater care in the making thereof, to guide the courts in interpret- 
ing and applying the law." Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. 
REV. 431, 444 (1966). 
274. R. DICKERSON, supra note 221, at 69. 
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legislative process.876 
This conception of legislative intention "seems to make its 
discovery near impossible."876 The realities of the legislative pro- 
cess, however, make intent less obscure than appears. As Profes- 
sor Bennett indicates: 
Most legislation is shaped by only a few legislators. The device 
of imputed purpose allows legislative purpose to be defined by 
the purposes of those few. The common use of committee re- 
ports or statements by sponsors of legislation is justifiable on 
this basis. The legislation itself may state one or more pur- 
poses. Even if none is stated, given what will typically be the 
common understanding of its social and economic context, the 
words of the legislation will be highly probative not only of leg- 
islator goals but even of background attitudes.277 
Therefore, intent need not be confined to evidence of individual 
legislators' subjective designs. Intention may be derived from 
"objective" indicia as well, such as the statutory text and 
context.a78 
However, even assuming that statutory meaning cannot be 
ascertained by reference to legislative intent, the separation of 
powers issue remains. If in proposing that the courts be guided 
by "a broad philosophical concept," the critics of intent intend 
to rely on another method for discerning the legislative will, 
then the objection is merely semantic. Surely the constitutional 
requirement that cognition precede creation is satisfied by any 
reliable indicia of the statute's meaning.279 If by their criticism, 
the critics suggest that the legislative will is altogether irrele- 
vant, they face the insuperable task of reconciling their sugges- 
tion with the constitutional provision of legislative supremacy. 
What the criticism implies, however, is that because of the na- 
ture of the democratic process, legislatures are not capable of 
resolving the controversial issues that typically arise in formu- 
lating civil rights policy.880 Therefore, legislation should be inter- 
275. See Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and 
Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049, 1071 (1979). 
276. Id. at 1072. 
277. Id. at 1073. 
278. See generally 2A C.  SANDS, supra note 213, $5 47.01-.20. 
279. See R. DICKERSON, supra note 221, at 79-85. 
280. Professor Neuborne notes that a legislature "does not and cannot foresee, 
much less resolve, the myriad questions which must arise whenever a broad philosophi- 
cal proposition is applied to the protean complexity of everyday life." Neuborne, supra 
note 185, at 553 (emphasis added). 
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preted essentially as a mandate to the courts to resolve these 
issues. 
2. Legislative competence to deal with civil rights issues 
The argument that the legislative branch cannot compe- 
tently protect the civil rights of individuals takes several forms: 
first, Congress cannot possibly foresee every conceivable contin- 
gency in formulating a statutory standard; second, the realities 
of the political process require that certain issues, even if fore- 
seen, must be compromised or avoided altogether in order to in- 
sure passage of the legislation.281 
Almost all legislation is prospective in nature and the occur- 
rence of unforeseen events is almost always inevitable. This fact 
alone, nevertheless, would not warrant a presumption favoring 
judicial policymaking in the civil rights field. Moreover, a stat- 
ute's sweep is not necessarily frozen as of the date of enact- 
ment.282 The meaning of a particular word or series of words 
need not be limited to a specific object or denotation, but may 
be directed toward general ideas or connotations. Therefore, the 
meaning of a statute may provide ample flexibility for meeting 
future needs without abrogating separation of powers. Legisla- 
tively created civil rights and remedies are distinct and indepen- 
dent of constitutional right and remedies. Therefore, considera- 
tions which, in the constitutional context, arguably justify an 
interpretative mode freed from the constraints of the "original 
intention" have considerably less force in a statutory context. 
The fact that courts may more efficiently implement civil rights 
policy does not warrant setting aside the balances struck by 
Congress in this area. 
3. Disruption of contemporary expectations 
The views of legislators concerning certain legislation may 
change over time: "Initially, legislation may have been passed 
with one purpose or set of purposes, but may remain on the stat- 
ute books at any given time for another."28s In other words, it is 
conceivable that a current nonrepeal purpose varies from the 
original purpose for which the statute was enacted? In addi- 
281. Bennett, supra note 275, at 1091; Neuborne, supra note 185, at 553-54. 
282. R. DICKERSON, supra note 221, at 127-28, 130. 
283. Bennett, supra note 275, at 1074. 
284. Id. at 1092. 
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tion, popular understanding of the meaning of a statute may 
conflict with the intention of the original framers. Consequently, 
"[tlhere will usually be some disruption, and perhaps a large 
quantum of disappointed expectations, if the current under- 
standing is rejected."28s In response to objections that the "rule 
of law" requires adherence to the original intention, proponents 
of an expanded judicial role in the interpretation of civil rights 
statutes answer as follows: "[Vliews of 'law' change just as do 
those about all aspects of human culture. Perhaps nothing is 
more likely to change views about 'law' than recurrent disap- 
pointment of current expectations caused by adherence to an 
older view.''aM Even if the intention of the original draftsmen is 
known, these factors, it is argued, present sufficient justification 
for allowing the current understanding to prevail. 
Professor Bennett recognized the practical difficulties in- 
volved in interpreting legislation in terms of an inferred 
nonrepeal purpose. "[I]ndifference or inertia" as well as changed 
purposes may motivate nonrepeal. Moreover, nonrepeal is a non- 
action and therefore need leave no "trace of its motivation." 
Furthermore, "nonrepeal requires no vote." Therefore "the justi- 
fication for imputing the purpose of one legislator to another 
. . . is also considerably weaker than in the case of original pas- 
sage." Consequently, Bennett would employ "a strong but not 
irrebuttable presumption that a statute's original purpose re- 
mains its contemporary purpose."m7 
Measuring the meaning of statutes by an inferred purpose 
or by current expectations not only presents serious difficulties 
of proof, but raises significant questions about the limits of judi- 
cial policymaking. Professor Dickerson illustrates these concerns 
as follows: 
To read statutes against current, rather than original, us- 
age and environment would subject statutory meanings to un- 
controlled and often capricious circumstance. Where the vagar- 
ies of usage and environment happened to produce results that 
were more congenial to current notions of public policy, a court 
would be tempted to take the present as a base. But what 
should it do where the results were less congenial? Or should 
the courts say that they will reflect current conditions where 
285. Id. 
286. Id. 
287. Id. at 1074. 
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they like the result and reject them where they do not?aee 
The argument that statutes should be interpreted in light of 
contemporary standards also raises fundamental questions about 
the respective roles of court and legislature. The argument im- 
plies that failure to adhere to current notions of public policy 
may undermine the rule of law. Arguably, in the constitutional 
context, where the amendment process often makes changes in 
the law dificult, this concern may have some relevance?@ But in 
a statutory context, widespread disappointment with the results 
produced by faithful adherence to the original purpose of the 
law will prompt a change in the law. That, in any case, should be 
the presumption in a democratic society. Adherence to a con- 
trary presumption is likely to result in a loss of faith in the rule 
of law.2w If there is not sufticient popular pressure to change the 
law through the democratic process, what justifies a change 
through nondemocratic processes? As Professor Dickerson 
warned: 
To [those] who believe that it is more wholesome to meet 
the needs of the future than to honor the dead past, we may 
reply that, because legislation is almost always pointed to the 
future, intended future results cannot be assured unless the 
historical event that an enactment immediately becomes is 
later honored by the courts. This means honoring the legisla- 
tive past. To do otherwise would substitute the courts for the 
legislature in the lawmaking pr~cess.~" 
Dickerson suggests that faithfulness to original intention 
does not necessarily remove all room for judicial response to 
changing circumstances and attitudes."- Nevertheless, the cog- 
nitive function is admittedly limited. If it "fails to produce an 
adequate result," Dickerson concludes, "the responsibility for 
correcting the matter is the legislature's, not the Re- 
sped for the democratic process also means that legislative in- 
tent not culminating in an enactment "may be generally ignored; 
288. R. DICKERSON, supra note 221, at 126. 
289. Bennett, supra note 275, at 1092-94. 
290. See generally R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 409-12 (1977); D. 
Ho~owrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 17-21, 33-56 (1977). 
291. R. DICKERSON, supra note 221, at 130. See also Kernochan, Statutory Interpre- 
tation: An Outline of Method, 3 DALHOUSIE L.J. 333, 345 (1976). 
292. R. DICKERSON, supra note 221, at 127-29. 
293. Id. at 129. 
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so may postenactment changes in the relevant context."294 Con- 
sequently, Dickerson rejects the idea that failure to amend stat- 
utes the courts have interpreted indicates legislative approval of 
the judicial interpretation. Likewise, subsequent legislative his- 
tory indicating approval of judicial interpretations is entitled to 
little weight in interpreting a prior enactment. Reenactment of 
prior legislation may enhance the evidentiary weight of contem- 
poraneous interpretations or intervening judicial or administra- 
tive interpretations. Where the legislature retains the original 
language, however, the presumption is strong that it also intends 
to retain the original   on text.'^ 
4. Protection of minority rights 
Courts historically have assumed responsibility for protect- 
ing minority rights. Since civil rights legislation is designed to 
protect minority groups, it is argued that the judiciary should be 
given broad power to construe civil rights legislation in further- 
ance of this remedial goal, much as the courts have wide discre- 
tion to construe constitutional provisions.le6 Implicit in this ar- 
gument is the assumption that the judiciary, as a 
nonrepresentative body, is better able to protect minority inter- 
ests than the legislature. Therefore, by enacting broad remedial 
measures, Congress should be presumed to have delegated to the 
courts the power to construe the legislation as broadly as current 
circumstances require? 
However, the notion that a democratic system tends to 
favor the interests of "some undifferentiated majority" at the 
expense of discrete minorities has recently come under sharp 
criticism.as@ One widely accepted theory views legislation as "the 
outcome of a pure power struggle . . . among narrow interest or 
pressure  group^."^@@ Under this "new realism about the political 
process," as Professor Posner describes it, "the very distinction 
between 'minority' and 'majority' disappears.'w00 If, as Professor 
294. I d  at 126. 
295. Id. at 179-83. 
296. See Neuborne, supra note 185, at 555 n.32. 
297. Id. 
298. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treat- 
ment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 30-31. 
299. Id. at 27. For a review of the literature on the "interest group" theory of legis- 
lation, see id. at 27 11.50. 
300. Id. at 28, 30. See also Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 
212 (1976). 
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Posner suggests, government by interest group "is an inevitable 
. . . feature of our society," for a court to undo what the process 
yields would "condemn as unconstitutional the most characteris- 
tic product of a democratic (perhaps of any) political system."s01 
5. Legislative veto 
It is frequently remarked in the literature on judicial review 
that statutory decisions are more easily overturned than consti- 
tutional decisions.s02 This fact is offered to justify expansive in- 
terpretations that "err" in favor of minorities.80s However, as 
pointed out earlier, this fact may also justify faithful adherence 
to the legislative will. Even conceding that erroneous statutory 
decisions are easier to revise, usurpation is no less usurpation 
because it appears in a statutory context. Moreover, our system 
is no less immune from the institutional erosion that inevitably 
accompanies judicial overreaching because the object of usurpa- 
tion is statutory rather than cons t i tu t i~nal .~~ 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the underlying premise of all the arguments for an 
interpretative mode that favors judicial creativity in the civil 
rights field is the feeling that if equal status is to be fully imple- 
mented in our society, the courts must do it. That is precisely 
the point. The deplorable conditions that gave impetus to the 
inexorable advance of egalitarianism are abating."06 More impor- 
tantly, the implementation of equal status results in unequal 
treatment. The immediate concerns that gave rise to the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 have long since been superseded by more am- 
bitious goals-goals that arguably have little if anything to do 
with "minorities." 
The legislature has not proven powerless in achieving social 
justice.s0. Nor has the idea of equality historically proven so un- 
301. Id. at 28. " 'The legislative way of life' " it has been noted, "is the essence of 
freedom under government." Mendelson, Mr. Justice Frankfurter on the Construction 
of Statutes, 43 CAI,. L. REV. 652, 653 (1955). 
302. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 164, at 9 11.33; Ely, Constitutional Interpretiuism: Its 
Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L. J. 399, 402 (1978). 
303. Neuborne, supra note 185, at 555-56. 
304. See generally Burden of Proof, supra note 30, at 1057 11.152. 
305. See Sowell, Myths about Minorities, COMMENTARY, August 1979, at 33; Brest, 
supra note 13, at 2. 
306. See, eg. ,  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 348-49 (1978) 
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persuasive that it need be feared that confining its scope to the 
constitutional framework will appreciably diminish the sphere of 
its influence. Resecuring the judiciary to its constitutional moor- 
ings in the area of statutory interpretation will not inhibit equal- 
ity's advocates from implementing this value through the demo- 
cratic process. On the other hand, failure to observe the 
strictures of the Constitution in this area may imperil the ability 
of others to implement equality's rival value-liberty. 
Stephen L. Fluckiger 
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the 10% "set-aside" 
by legislatures for public work project funds for minority businesses). 
